Over the past few years, the Armenian Weekly, with both its regular and special issues, has become a forum where already prominent as well as up-and-coming scholars, journalists, and activists from around the globe share their insight, research, and analyses on issues related to history, human rights, and current affairs.

Keeping true to this “young” tradition, this special issue of the Weekly, titled “Commemorating Genocide: Images, Perspectives, Research” deals with genocide, memory, and denial. It brings together archival historians, political analysts, commentators, and photographers who embark on a journey to shed light on the scourge of genocide, the scars of denial, and the spirit of memory.

In papers especially written for this publication, Kaiser, Aghjayan, and Bjornlund look at some archival documents from the Ottoman Empire and Scandinavia; Ungor, Hur, and Gunaysu address the issue of the destruction (and construction) of memory; Sanjian studies the Azerbaijani dimension of genocide denial; Weitz looks at the shared histories of the Holocaust and the Medz Yeghern; while Theriault, Bayrakdar, Ayata, Papazian, and Kotchikian discuss Turkish-Armenian and Kurdish-Armenian relations and dynamics.

This publication also features photographs by Dermansky, of genocide memorials worldwide, and by Rivest, of post-genocide Rwanda. We thank photographers Oshagan and Parian for the cover photo and Koundakjian for the photo of the Armenian Genocide Memorial in Zizdzer-nagapert in Yerevan.

Most pages of this publication feature victims and survivors of the Armenian Genocide. We found it appropriate to remember them, to associate faces and names with a crime that is so often reduced to just contested numbers of its victims and disposessed. We thank their families for supporting this publication.

We also thank the churches, organizations, and individuals that made the publication of this issue possible.
George Aghjayan is a fellow of the Society of Actuaries and author of *Genocide Denial: Denialist Rhetoric Compared: The Armenian Genocide and The Holocaust*. He is chairman of the Armenian National Committee (ANC) of Central Massachusetts and is a frequent contributor to the Armenian Weekly. He resides in Worcester with his wife and three children.

Bilgin Ayata is completing her Ph.D. at the department of political science at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore. Her research interests include the politics of displacement, trans-nationalism, social movements, and migration. Her dissertation examines the displacement of Kurds in Turkey and Europe. She currently lives in Berlin.

Seyhan Bayraktar holds a research position at the department of politics and public administration at the University of Konstanz in Germany, where she has taught masters-level courses in comparative genocide studies and European integration. She recently submitted her Ph.D. thesis, titled “Politics of Denial: The development of the discourse about the murder of the Ottoman Armenians of 1915 in Turkey between foreign political pressure and nationalistic defense mechanisms.” Her research focuses on memory and identity politics, nationalism, political communication, discourse analysis, cultural aspects of political integration, and Turkey’s minority politics. Her current research focuses on migration politics and the role of integration and assimilation in the current migration discourse in Germany.

Matthias Bjornlund was born in Copenhagen, Denmark, in 1967. He is a Danish historian and freelance researcher specializing in the Armenian Genocide and related issues, particularly as documented in Danish archival sources. He is currently working on a book about Denmark and the “Armenian Question” from 1900–40. He has co-authored articles on the concept of genocide and on aspects of the Rwandan genocide.

Ayse Hur was born in Artvin, Turkey, in 1956. She lived with her parents in Urfa, Nazilli (Aydin), and Edirne, then moved to Istanbul. Having completed her double-major in 1992 from the departments of history and international relations at Bogazici University, she joined the History Foundation of Turkey and worked on such projects as the Istanbul Encyclopedia. In 2004, she completed her master’s thesis on “The European Union’s Policies of Reconciling with History and the Armenian Question” at the Ataturk Institute of Bogazici University. She is currently pursuing her doctorate degree at the same institution. She is a member of the editorial board of Social History, and writes historical and political articles in various newspapers and journals, including Taraf, Radikal, Birikim, and Agos.

Hilmar Kaiser received his Ph.D. from the European University Institute, Florence. He specializes in Ottoman social and economic history as well as the Armenian Genocide. He has done research in more than 60 archives worldwide, including the Ottoman Archives in Istanbul. His published works—monographs, edited volumes, and articles—include “Imperialism, Racism, and Development Theories: The Construction of a Dominant Paradigm on Ottoman Armenians,” “At the Crossroads of Der Zor: Death Survival and Humanitarian Resistance in Aleppo, 1915–1917,” “The Baghdad Railway and the Armenian Genocide, 1915–1916: A Case Study in German Resistance and Complicity,” “1915–1916 Ermeni Soykırımı Sirasinda Ermeni Mülkleri, Osmanlı Hukuku ve Milliyet Politikalari,” “Le génocide arménien: négation à ‘l’allemande’” and “From Empire to Republic: The Continuities for Turkish Denial.”

Ayse Gunaysu is a professional translator, human rights advocate, former communist, and feminist. She has been a member of the Committee Against Racism and Discrimination of the Human Rights Association of Turkey (Istanbul branch) since 1995, and was a columnist in a pro-Kurdish daily from 2005–07.

Dennis R. Papazian is professor emeritus of history and the founding director of the Armenian Research Center at the University of Michigan, Dearborn. He is the former president of the Society for Armenian Studies and former editor of the Journal of the Society for Armenian Studies, currently serving on its editorial board.

Asbed Kotchikian is the assistant director of the International Affairs Program at Florida State University, where he also teaches courses on the Middle East and former Soviet space. His area of research includes the foreign policies of small states; the modern political history of the post-Soviet South Caucasus; and issues of national identity.
Ara Sanjian is associate professor of Armenian and Middle Eastern history and the director of the Armenian Research Center at the University of Michigan-Dearborn. He was born in Beirut, Lebanon, and received his school education there. In 1991, he received his master’s degree in history from Yerevan State University. In 1994, he received his Ph.D. in modern Middle Eastern history from the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London. From 1996–2005, he was the chairman of the department of Armenian studies, history and political science at Haigazian University in Beirut. In fall 2003, he was the Henry S. Khanzadian Kazan Visiting Professor in Armenian Studies at California State University, Fresno. His research interests focus on the post-World War I history of Armenia, Turkey, and the Arab states of Western Asia. He is the author of *Turkey and Her Arab Neighbors, 1953–1958: A Study in the Origins and Failure of the Baghdad Pact* (2001), as well as a monograph and a number of scholarly articles. He is currently working on a book-length project on the Armenian quest for Mountainous Karabagh under Soviet rule in 1923–87.

Henry Theriault is associate professor of philosophy at Worcester State College, where he has taught since 1998. His research focuses on genocide and human rights, with particular emphasis on genocide denial and its epistemological dimensions, the long-term impact of genocide and other mass violence, their ethical and political implications, and mass violence against women. His teaching includes courses on genocide and human rights, mass violence against women, the Armenian Genocide, ethics, political philosophy, the philosophy of history, and gender/sexuality/race/class/nation. Theriault currently serves as co-editor-in-chief of the peer-reviewed journal “Genocide Studies and Prevention.” He is also on the Advisory Council of the International Association of Genocide Scholars. From 1999 to 2007, he was coordinator of the Worcester State College Center for the Study of Human Rights.

Ugur Umit Ungor was born in 1980 and studied sociology and history at the Universities of Groningen, Utrecht, Toronto, and Amsterdam. His main area of interest is the historical sociology of mass violence and nationalism in the modern world. He has published on genocide, in general, and on the Rwandan and Armenian genocides, in particular. At present, he is finishing his Ph.D., titled “Young Turk Social Engineering: Genocide, Nationalism, and Memory in Eastern Turkey, 1913–1950” at the department of history of the University of Amsterdam. He is also a staff member at the Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies in Amsterdam.

Eric D. Weitz is Distinguished McKnight University Professor of History at the University of Minnesota, where he also holds the Arsham and Charlotte Ohanessian Chair in the College of Liberal Arts. He has published *A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation* (2003) and, most recently, *Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy* (2007), and edits a series, *Human Rights and Crimes against Humanity*, all with Princeton University Press. *Weimar Germany* was included in the “Year in Books” list of the Financial Times (London). A *Century of Genocide* was named a Choice Outstanding Academic Title for 2003.
Nothing but Ambiguous

The Killing of Hrant Dink in Turkish Discourse

By Seyhan Bayraktar

The assassination of Hrant Dink was in several respects a decisive moment, for it revealed the state-of-the-art of Vergangenheitsbewältigung in Turkey and ultimately the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation process. This paper examines how Hrant Dink's assassination was framed in the Turkish discourse.

The analysis is part of the overall research agenda on the phenomenon of Turkish denial of 1915. The denial politics of Turkey has not only been successful in blocking international genocide acknowledgements for a long time but also in determining the academic discourse on the Armenian Genocide. Not surprisingly, there is hardly any analysis on the Armenian history of 1915 that does not address the denial phenomenon in either way.

However, most studies approach the denial phenomenon in a rather conventional manner. Scholars either look at the Turkish state's politics and practices, or at the civil society's increasing interest and openness for alternative readings of the history of 1915. Such a distinction between politics and society, however, reduces the denial phenomenon to the Turkish state's past politics. It also implies that the coming to terms with the past of the Turkish society takes place outside the framework of the denial discourse which, as already said above, is by and large equated with the Turkish state's political practices and defense mechanisms against genocide charges.

However, prioritizing the Turkish state as the key actor of the denial discourse about the Armenian Genocide overlooks the power that rests in the discourse itself. Put differently, the understanding of the working mechanisms of discursive structures on the one hand and the interplay with political and societal options on the other is underdeveloped. The following analysis addresses this lacuna: It looks at the reactions of the Turkish society upon Hrant Dink's assassination and relates these reactions to the conventional discourse structures in Turkey about the Armenian Genocide. In doing this, the study gives an insight to the question on how far conventional (denialist) discourse patterns about the Armenian Genocide have been reproduced, challenged, or changed in the course of reactions to the assassination of Dink.

In essence, the analysis shows that although actors had the opportunity to challenge denialist discourse patterns, they didn't do so and instead chose framings which ultimately reproduced and fostered the denial discourse.

THE CONTEXT: THE KILLING OF HRANT DINK AS A BREAKING POINT

The news of Hrant Dink's assassination shook Turkey. It turned into a major political scandal, for it became evident that it could have been prevented if the state security institutions had taken the information from the circles close to the assassin and his clients seriously. The dimension of carelessness if not wanton negligence and active participation of state institutions and actors in the murder is indicated by the headline "Only Hrant was not informed about his killing."
Helplessness, mourning, and shame caught especially the Turkish liberal elites on the news of the killing. Thousands gathered spontaneously on the streets and mourned the death. The funeral turned into a mass protest with tens of thousands accompanying Dink on his last journey, which again led to widespread relief.7

This solidarity, however, was accompanied by an outright reactionary discourse right from the beginning.8 Especially the slogan of the crowds at the funeral, “We are all Armenians,” caused a controversial debate. The nationalists were quick with producing the counter-slogan, “We are all Turks.” The Turkish daily Hurriyet ran a poll for three days on its website asking the readers whether they found the slogan appropriate.

In essence, the killing of Dink meant the breaking of a tacit societal agreement not to hurt Armenians in the open, lest to commit a politically motivated crime. This silent consensus goes back to the national narrative that the Turkish Republic does not discriminate among its citizens.9 With the increasing pressure on Turkey—first through militant activism beginning in the 1970’s and later by political genocide acknowledgments—to come to terms with 1915, the narrative of equality became particularly important. Accordingly, it was stressed that the Armenians had no problems in Turkey, were content and safe regardless of the implication that this was by itself the very indication of discrimination. From this perspective, the killing of Hrant Dink—an Armenian citizen of Turkey—brought to the open the blatant discrepancy between social reality and the construction of “our equal, safe and happy Armenians.” Hence, it was the breaking of this taboo that essentially constituted the societal and political trauma in Turkey following the killing of Dink.

While the breaking of the tacit consensus by killing Dink posed a problem that the entire society had to cope with, it had additional implications for the Turkish liberal elites. First of all, Dink had close personal ties in a wide reaching network among Turkish intellectuals. This meant that a considerable group of leading Turkish media and other public representatives had hard times emotionally in individually coping with the loss of a friend. Secondly, the assassination all of a sudden stopped the relative optimism of Turkish liberal circles about a gradual opening of the Turkish society with regard to the Armenian Question.10

Common to a vast majority of the texts in both arenas was an instrumental logic and strategic thinking that ultimately had a concealing effect on the distinctive characteristic of the event. Instrumentality, however, took a wide spectrum of manifestations ranging from outright political calculations to more subtle forms of rational reasoning. One example of an overtly instrumental approach is the very first reaction of Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan lamenting the timing of the killing (manidar) and alluding to the genocide resolution that was being debated in the United States. Mehmet Ali Birand, a well-known liberal journalist in Turkey, was also immediately concerned with strategic political considerations than condemning the assassination as such.

However, moves to immediately go back to normalcy were met partially with criticism. The editor-in-chief of Radikal, Ismet Berkan, complained that “shamelessness (was) without limits in this country,” where even the least bit of respect was lacking.11 However, such criticism about strategic calculations and instrumental framing was the exception rather than the rule.

THE TEXT: TURKISH MAINSTREAM DAILIES AND WATS AS DISCOURSE ARENAS

The assassination of Hrant Dink was on the front-page of the Turkish mainstream dailies for weeks, resulting in hundreds of articles and commentaries.12 Naturally, the killing also dominated the debate of the Workshop for Armenian Turkish Scholarship (WATS), a platform for academic discussions on Turkish-Armenian issues.13 While the mainstream Turkish media reaches a domestic audience, meaning Turkish society and politics, WATS has a mixed audience in several respects.14 The capacity of these two arenas, however, is not limited to their respective audiences; both arenas can also shape external discourses.

DEJA-VU: TURKEY AS VICTIM

A less overtly instrumental approach to the killing was the initially predominant presentation of the killing under the category “the bullets hit Turkey.”15 This framing turned Turkey and the Turkish nation into the “real” victims of the crime. According to this approach, the assassin and his clients had obviously not been aware that they “had in fact shot Turkey.”16 Very few voices chose to give priority to Hrant Dink in terms of victimship, as is the case in the headline “Racists’ target Hrant Dink: assassination with three bullets.”17

The victim discourse in the mainstream media focusing on Turkey and the Turkish nation neglected to talk about the socio-psychological implications for the Armenian community.18 Hurriyet’s editor-in-chief, Ertuğrul Özkok, for example made a case for the murder by stressing the societal and socio-economic conditions that would lead a young man to commit such a crime.19 This move was an attempt for empathy with the murderer, who was portrayed as being himself a victim of socio-structural forces. The concerns of the Turkish society were not forgotten on the Workshop for Armenian-Turkish Scholarship (WATS) listserve either. Shortly after the assassination one of the founders of WATS, Fatma Muge Gocek, made a plea to go on with reconciliation efforts.20 For this to take place, she stressed the necessity to be sensitive to the socio-psychological needs of both the Armenian and Turkish societies with regard to the term “genocide.” Dink’s usage of the term depending on which audience he had addressed was portrayed as an exemplary approach for such an appropriate sensitivity towards both societies. Accordingly, when “talking to the Turks in Turkey, he would….not make the employment of the term ‘genocide’ his top priority. [Instead, he] especially resisted to exercise his freedom of expression through the specific employment of the term ‘genocide’. He ultimately was not tried and sentenced for the use of that term, but ironically for his discussion of the prejudice as it pertained not to Turks but the Armenian Diaspora.”21
This presentation was in several respects highly problematic. As a key actor in the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation discourse, Goeck legitimized her suggestion to be sensitive in using the term “genocide” not only by referring to Dink but also by putting equal weight on the needs of both societies. Under different circumstances such an approach could be characterized as balanced but in this particular context, where an Armenian in Turkey was murdered because he was an Armenian, the timing of the demand to be equally sensitive to the needs of both societies reveals the neglect to account for the unequal situation in which Armenians in Turkey actually live. From this perspective, the balanced approach was a similar shift to the concerns of the Turkish society and Turkey as in the mainstream media.

In contrast to the almost total neglect of taking the situation of the Armenian community into account, Rakel Dink, the wife of Hrant Dink, became the exclusive center of interest after her speech at her husband’s funeral. Her “Last letter to the beloved” was published in full text in almost all the dailies under consideration, was translated into English on the WATS forum and led to a lot of commentaries. All of Turkey was apparently deeply impressed by the unresentful stance that Rakel Dink revealed within few days.

Many commentators who chose to invoke the framing that what happened was not good for the country also stressed in abundance that Dink had been a passionate “Turkey lover” (Türkiye sevdalısı). He had loved this country more than anything else. Not least, he had been the very symbol of reconciliation and tolerance (bir uzlaşma bir hırsız semboluydu). The underlying subtle instrumental logic becomes clear when one raises the counter-factual question: What if he had not loved this country? Or, what if his killing would not have damaged the image of Turkey? The same goes for the innumerable individual accounts and personal memories about Hrant Dink that mostly stressed his strengths as a human being along with his engagement for a democratic Turkish society. Here we go again: What if he had not been an upright colleague, a courageous fellow, a dear friend? Not least, individual memories emphasizing almost exclusively his human qualities and sensitive political style, constructing him into “a man with a heart of gold” eclipsed the ultimate political concern of Dink’s killing—like that of its famous precedents Ugur Mumcu in 1993 and Ahmet Taner Kılalı in 1999—to a critical moment in Turkish domestic and foreign politics.

The construction of continuity suffered, however, from internal contradictions. One case in point is Guneri Civaoglu’s approach to the killing. Civaoglu stressed the continuity of the current event in the recent history of Turkey in two articles. In the first one, he applied the category of “another journalist victim.” In the second article, he jumped to a different category of continuity when feeling obliged to remember the victims of the attacks of ASALA on Turkish diplomats. While Civaoglu’s take on the “other martyrs” (diger şehitleri anna) implied that he included Dink in the category of “our losses,” his revival of the ASALA memory in the current context produced a contradiction in terms of the logic on which the construction of continuity was based. Including Dink in the category of “another journalist killed” highlighted the professional identity and was an attempt to eclipse the ethnic nature of the killing of Hrant Dink. The talk of ASALA, however, emphasized the ethnic roots of the current event all the more but put the blame, at the same time, on the Armenians.

In the end, Civaoglu’s attempt to make Dink “one of us” by including him in the list of national martyrs failed, for it suffered not only due to the contradictory and in a sense mutually exclusive logics of constructions of continuity, but also because of the effect that bringing ASALA back into the discourse about Hrant Dink had. Intentionally or not, with this blurring he put the blame of the current killing ultimately on the Armenian side.

CONTINUITY VERSUS BREAK: THE FRAME OF ‘ANOTHER JOURNALIST KILLED’

Another immediate move in the mainstream media to frame the event was to subsume the killing under the category of “another journalist killed” thereby stressing continuity rather than the distinctiveness of the killing. Hurriyet was among the forerunners of this move. Already in the live-coverage of the killing, Dink was presented as the “62nd assassinated journalist victim since Hasan Fehmi 1909.”

The frame of “another journalist killed” was invoked by the overwhelming majority of the commentators. It was an inclusive frame that provided a basis for identification. In addition, while identifying with Dink as a journalist, commentators also reproduced the topos of “damage to Turkey” when relating the timing of Dink’s killing—like that of its famous precedents Ugur Mumcu in 1993 and Ahmet Taner Kılalı in 1999—to a critical moment in Turkish domestic and foreign politics.

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‘OUR’ ARMENIANS VERSUS THE DIASPORA

Empirically, the distinction between Armenians in Turkey and diaspora Armenians is among the first and most robust instruments or strategies in the Turkish discourse about the Armenian Genocide that goes back to the 1960’s. In the 1970’s, as the unfolding of a systematic targeting of mainly Turkish diplomats forced Turkish society to remember 1915, the need to differentiate between “our” Armenians, “who condemn the attack even more than we do” and the diaspora fanatics (azlıl Türk düşmanları) increased, albeit parallel to still abundant populist anti-Armenian images. Such a differentiation was mainly due to the concern not to provoke another Sept. 6–7, 1955.

The construction of a dichotomy between “our” Armenians and the rest ceased to play an important role in the general discourse on the Armenian Genocide since the turn of the millennium. Although the Turkish Foreign Ministry’s policies to counter
The Turkish discourse following the killing of Hrant Dink revealed an ambiguous picture, stemming mainly from the discrepancy between the traumatic experience caused by the assassination and the reluctance of the Turkish society and politics to face the killing as an ultimate breakdown of the national narrative about the equality of all citizens of the republic regardless their ethnic origins. The dominant framings in the discourse were in essence hiding the racist thrust of the killing. The emphasis on the continuities rather than the distinctive aspects of the assassination was an effective strategy toward concealing the particularly tragic and politically relevant aspect of the killing, namely, that the first Armenian in the history of the republic who had ever attempted to step outside the proper place that was assigned to him by the dominant society had literally not survived such an undertaking. Particularly telling in terms of the relative lack of challenges to the conventional denialist Turkish discourse was that even the most liberal Turks, who at the same time had known Hrant Dink’s political concerns, used instrumental framings that enforced rather than challenged the denialist structures of the Turkish discourse on the Armenian Genocide.

ENDNOTES
1 I want to thank Bilgin Ayata, Ayda Eral, Ani Degirmencioglu, Khatchig Mouradian, Marc Maimonijian, Anjaren Rana, and Stephanie Reulen for comments, proofreading and for providing me with information.
2 The German equivalent of coming to terms with the past (Vergangenheitswahrnehmung) characterizes the relatively exemplary and exceptional manner of Germany’s coping patterns with the Holocaust.
3 The case study is part of my dissertation thesis, “Politics of Denial: The Development of the Discourse about the Murder of the Ottoman Armenians of 1915 in Turkey between Foreign Political Pressure and Nationalistic Defense Mechanisms,” submitted to the political science department of the University of Konstanz.
5 Following Ole Wiærü, “Discursive Approaches” in European Integration Theory, edited by A. Wiærü and T. Diez (Oxford University Press, 2004), the current analysis softens the understanding of the relationship between discourse—broadly understood as a set of articulations—and actors as defined in poststructuralist Foucauldian discourse analysis. While the latter assumes discourse as being prior to actors in the sense that subjects do not exist outside discourse, the theoretical assumption of this study is that actors have at least the possibility to choose among different sets of discourse patterns. In other words, the existing discourse patterns (regardless of the question of causality and the determination of the Armenian Genocide determine on the one hand the range of possibilities of how to frame a related event such as the killing of Hrant Dink. On the other hand, they are at the same time dependent on actors because discourses are produced and reproduced by the choices of actors over which of the existing discourse frames to actually use and which not. It is this kind of “linguistic structuration” that provides for the theoretical possibility for change of discourses, in a general sense, and in the current context the discourse about the Armenian Genocide in Turkey, in particular. For the concept of linguistic-structuration, see Diez, 1999, “Speaking ‘Europe’: the politics of integration discourse” in the Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 6, pp. 598–613.
7 The relief after the funeral is particularly mirrored in Hadi Uluengin’s piece, “Ciktik cenaze (The lessons of a funeral)” in Hurriyet, Jan. 24, 2007. For another article indicating relief—albeit in a more revanchist tone—see Öktay Eksi, “Ders veren cenaze (The lessons of a funeral)” in Hurriyet, Jan. 24, 2007. For other examples, see the headlines “Türkiye erlavidini ugarladi (Turkey said farewell to her son)” in Hurriyet, Jan. 24, 2007; “İstanbul İstanbul olabilir boyle bir türen gurulmuştu (Istanbul has never seen such a funeral since times immemorial)” in Radikal, Jan. 24, 2007; “Sizin Hrant Dink oldu mu? (Do you think that Hrant Dink died?)” in Milliyet, Jan.

When former Prime Minister Tansu Ciller suggested to "expell the roughly 70,000 Armenians from Turkey" as a political means to counter international genocide acknowledgments, there was a huge public outcry as to her racist and separatist suggestion. Ciller was depicted in a Hitler-pose saying, "Well, yes. It's an old but effective method." See Cumhuriyet, Oct. 20, 2000. As a result, Ciller had to step back and make clear that she had not the Armenians of Turkey in mind but the partly illegally labor force from the Armenian Republic. A similar suggestion at the end of 2006 by the former diplomat Sukru Elekdag with regard to genocide acknowledgement in the U.S. Congress also met with criticism of discrimination. For the defense of Ciller in Kafasiyla (With Ciller's mindset) in Hurriyet, Oct. 8, 2000. As a result, Ciller seemed to indicate a "postnationalist discourse, " as termed in Yeniden Safak, and Radikal from Feb. 19–24, 2007.


"Hrant Dink was the only person who was actually sentenced in a series of trials against intellectuals on the basis of Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, which by and large punishes those who insult Turks. The court sentenced him for an article in his weekly Agos, in which he in fact had criticized his fellows in the diaspora because of their alleged "anti-Turkish" stance and had appealed to the need to get rid of such anti-Turkish sentiments in order for Armenians, too, to come to terms with the past. See Hanit Dink, "The "Turk" of the Armenian" in Agos, Jan. 23, 2004. The fact that he was the only one who was sentenced for having insulted Turkishness as against all the other accused intellectuals who were ethnic Turks and that the court had not even accepted reports by experts that the article did not contain any insult to Turkishness revealed not least the unequal treatment of his case because of his ethnic affiliation. Dink expressed his deep disappointment about this blatant discrimination in one of his last articles, "Niniz Hefset Scdslim (Why I have become a target)" in Agos, Jan. 10, 2007.

22 This neglect of Geocce, however, changed considerably with time. As the son of Hrant Dink, Arat Dink, and a key figure of Agos, Sarkis Seropyan, were convicted of having insulted Turkishness a few months later, Geocce strongly criticized the "blatant discrimination of Armenians in Turkey based on prejudice." See Geocce, "On the recent convictions of Sarkis Seropyan and Arat Dink" online at www.cilicia.com/2007/10/hrant-dinks-cons-convicted-of-same.html. For this consider-able change, compare also the following footnote.

23 Another problematic aspect of the reconciliation plea—besides the timing of the making of a case for the so-called psychology of the Turkish society—is the construction of Dink as someone having "resisted his exercise of freedom of speech" to use the term "genocide" as if he had done this under no constraints and by his own ultimate free will—showing actual structural constraints. At the time of Dink's death and hence at the time of the reconciliation plea of Geocce—there was a new trial running against Dink of having insulted Turkishness on the basis of Article 301. This time, the alleged delict of insult was exactly his actual use of the term "genocide" in an interview for Reuters Agency on July 14, 2006. From this perspective, arguing on the basis of the previous trial and stressing that Dink "ultimately was not tried and sentenced for the use of the term" is a shortened account of the actual situation, if not outright cynical. For, as already said above, Dink was at the time of the reconciliation plea and his death on trial for using that very term and did not even have the chance to utter "genocide" a second time, since he did not survive the first time. I thank Bilgin Aydga for putting my attention on the point of a seconded change. See Retrospective on Trials against Dink" in Bayern online at www.bayern.org/bayen/kategorii/engle/9048/retrospective-on-trials-against-hrant-dink.


25 See also Erbal, Ayda. "We are all Oxyromons." The Armenian Weekly, April 24, 2007 who criticized one particular implication of such an approach, namely, if it is less worrisome when an Armenian who does not care so much about Turkey is murdered.


29 Guneri Civoaga, "Can Kurturu (Blood Culture)" in Milliyet, Jan. 21, 2007. Can Dunar, one of the leading figures of the Turkish left and a good friend of Dink himself, also revived the talk about the ASALA. See "Hepiniz Ermeni miyim? (Are All of us Armenians?)" in Milliyet, Jan. 22, 2007.

After it was clear that the Ottoman Empire lost World War I, and until 1920, it was not as hard as it is today to talk about “what happened between 1915 and 1917,” which we, for one reason or another, cannot decide whether to call “deportation” or “mutual murder” or “massacre” or “decimation” or “genocide.” In those years even the perpetrators accepted that it was a “massacre” or a “calamity.” But the nature of the discussion started to change after 1920. Policies were implemented to erase what was done to the Armenians from the collective memory. At first, this act of “forgetting” was a “precondition” for Turkish identity; in time it became an element of its “continuation.” Today it is its “constitutive element.”

What is more, it was not only what happened in 1915–17 that was forgotten, but the whole republican history.

The first stage of this process of forgetting was the adoption of the Latin alphabet in place of the Arabic alphabet. Consequently, later generations were prevented from reading the documents written before 1930. In this way, the connections with the past were at the hands of “historians” who followed the state line. In some ways, this became the objective cause of not remembering. The second stage was the introduction of the Turkish Historical Thesis, which was one of the parameters of the common ideal that the “Turkish nation” (something the state was trying to create) was to circle around. This odd thesis, according to which all societies in the world had Turkish origins, was aimed at both restoring the pride that was damaged by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and blocking the “non-Turkish” elements (such as the Armenians, Greeks, and Kurds) that could claim “historical rights” on Anatolia. In 1936, the Sun-Language Theory, according to which all human languages were derived from Turkish, stated in the super-text that the “Turkish race is the founder of all the civilizations in the world, therefore it is superior,” and in the subtext that “all people in Anatolia are Turkish, but because of ‘perversions’ regarding language and religion they forgot that they were Turkish.”

News that the novel Forty Days in Musa Dagh, by the Prague-born Jewish intellectual Franz Werfel, was going to be turned into a film gave the Kemalist establishment the idea that other countries could give Turkey a hard time by “provoking Armenians.”

The novel attracted much attention when it was published in Vienna in March 1933, but Turkey grasped the situation nine months later. On Dec. 25, 1934, an article by Falih Rifki, the leading Kemalist ideologue, that warned the German authorities of the book appeared in Hakimiyet-i Milliye, which was regarded as the official newspaper of the government. On Dec. 27–28 in the same paper, journalist Burhan Asaf (Belge) spoke sarcastically of Werfel, saying that “it is obvious from the book that he drinks too much Armenian coffee,” and blaming him for “wanting to rear up the Armenian horse standing on the eroded and leveled Christian morality, with a Faustian roar.” Shortly after, the warnings led the Nazi propaganda minister Goebbels to announce that the book was banned. But it was too late, for the book had already become very popular among German Jews. When Werfel’s publisher convinced him to sell the rights of his book to Metro Goldwyn-Mayer, one of the giants at the time, and when 35,000 copies of the book sold in two weeks and broke the record in 1934, Turkey was alarmed. The newspapers, especially Cumhuriyet and Ulus, which expressed the views of the leading party (RPP), emphasized that MGM was “a Jewish company” and suggested that this event was an “Armenian-Jewish conspiracy.”

When this was happening, the Armenian Community Temporal Committee, which was kept as almost a hostage in Istanbul, was forced to condemn the event. On Dec. 15, 1935, a group of Armenians gathered in the Pangalti Armenian Church and burned copies of the book—because it was “full of slander against the Turkish nation”—while singing the Turkish national anthem. In 1936, after the French edition of the book was published in France, MGM announced that they would not be making the film. It looked as if Turkey had won a war against the Armenians. This event resulted in Turkey’s having a more cautious, more suspicious, more defensive attitude against the international community. The fear that the smallest loosening could lead to the loss of
Anatolia, which was held on to with great difficulty, was implemented deep in the hearts of the Kemalist elite.

When Moscow accepted (with the help of Yakov Zorobian, who was the secretary of the Central Committee of Armenian Supreme Soviet) the demand from a group of Armenian scientists to erect a monument on the 50th anniversary of the genocide, the Armenian community in Turkey became a target. The evaluation report by Philip Clock of the U.S. Embassy described the situation as follows: “Lately, an issue that is rarely mentioned in modern Turkey, and almost never in the media, started to become a subject of discussion in public: the question of the Armenian minority in Turkey. The word ‘Armenian’ usually doesn’t even occur in the media in long periods of time. The curriculum of state schools is inclined to ignore this subject entirely. The people keep saying that the structures in Central and East Anatolia, which any foreign observer can tell that they are Armenian-made, are made by Turks or by some other group. The issue of the Armenian minority, which is thus ignored and apparently forgotten, was revived by the prospects of the conference on the fiftieth anniversary (of 1915), which will be held on April 24th in Beirut.”

Indeed, Cuneyd Arcayurek, the Ankara correspondent of Hurriyet—the “amiral ship” of the mainstream media—wrote on April 8, 1965: “It is known that in the years of World War I, during various domestic activities, Armenians rebelled in various regions and provinces, and even committed atrocities against Turks. Since various major problems were being faced at the time, and with the influence of Russia on the one hand, and the ally Germany on the other, attempts were made to put an end to it. Turks were killed by Armenians, and Armenians were killed during the suppression of the rebellion. Some of them left or were made to leave the country. But the fact today is this: We have around 80,000 Armenian citizens in Turkey now and every single one of them is a member of the Turkish nation. It is impossible for hardworking, knowledgeable, dutiful Turkish Armenians not to regret such a campaign.” In short, a handful of Armenians who could somehow manage to stay in the country were reminded of the fact that they were hostages to the state.

That must have worked, for the next day Hurriyet would state, under the heading “It’s our Armenian citizens’ turn,” that “Tens of thousands of Armenian citizens living in our city detest the Greek-fueled commemorations on April 24th under the name ‘Armenian massacre,’ which is the exploitation of an old event. Armenians in Istanbul said, ‘This can only be a trick of the Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister Kipriyanu. Some Armenians may be exploited unintentionally. We, Armenians of Turkey, have forgotten the past and are living in absolute peace and happiness’.”

What is noteworthy is that an appeal to anti-Greek sentiments related to the Cyprus issue was needed for activating the masses against Armenian nationalism. This was understandable; due to the systematic policies erasing the memories and in the absence of the catalyzing effect of current problems, the people might not have remembered what Armenians wanted from Turks, and thus might not have understood why Armenians were to be stopped. The Spiritual Leader of Armenians, Catholicos Bogos Kirecyan; a former member of the Republican Senate, Berc Turan; the Patriarch of Armenians in Turkey, Snork Kalustyan; and Nubar Gulbenkian, the son of Kalust Sarkis Gulbenkian, also known as “Mr. Five Percent,” realized the extent of the danger and had to declare their loyalty once again. After these declarations, Refi Cevat Ulunay, the editor-in-chief of Milliyet, another mainstream newspaper, wrote: “As the late Ahmet Refik [Altinay] said, [what is at issue is] the two massacres of the two committees, one Union and Progress, the other Tashnag. Even history would not want this argument again.” So the memories brought to life by the Armenian diaspora were being forced into dark drawers again.

THE ASALA EFFECT

The activities of ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia; in Armenian, Hayastani Asaturutyun Hay Gaghtni Banak) between 1975 and 1984 caused the media to be fully involved in the ideological struggle. Thousands of articles were published along the lines of the official theses of the state. These articles shared the feature of connecting ASALA’s activities to the activities of the Kurdish PKK movement. The intelligence circles, in particular, often claimed that in 1979–80 in Lebanon, an alliance between the PKK and ASALA was established with the leadership of Greece and Syria to sabotage Turkey’s Cyprus policies; the ultimate aim of that alliance was to found the “Armenian-Kurdish Federal State.” In this way, both the Kurdish and the Armenian demands were made illegitimate.

Since the majority of the people were in such a severe state of forgetfulness that they had difficulty understanding the reason behind these attacks, facing the Armenian issue in this way had a very “negative” effect. More precisely, with a retrospective reading of history, it helped the idea that “the Unionists were right to do away with this dangerous group” to settle into the unconscious of Turkish society. Official politicians and the media engraved the equation “Armenian = ASALA = terror” in the memory of the society. The association of the notion of terror with Armenians was so successful that in later years, the equation “Abdullah Ocalan = terror = Armenian seed” was easily adopted by the public.

PARLIAMENTARY RESOLUTIONS

Starting from 1980’s, when various countries designated April 24th as “Armenian Genocide Commemoration Day,” and when parliaments started to pass “genocide recognition resolutions,” the Turkish state decided to broaden the ideological fight against the Armenian theses. This primarily meant a more effective use of the “national education” system.

As we mentioned earlier, since the beginning of the republic, history production was equated with the production of national identity, and the authoritarian state model was presented as something that was “naturally” related to the national identity, and was an extension of this national identity. The first rule was to make Turkish history “clean and honorable.” The aim was to create the myth of a “Turkish” race that had stayed the same for almost 10,000 years on Anatolian lands, while all other races faded away. However, there were two periods. Before Turkey was pressed by ASALA and the parliamentary resolutions about the genocide, Armenians were sometimes mentioned as subjects of a distant past, and in general the language was not so negative. The capture of Ani, the capital of the Armenian Kingdom of Bagrati, by the Seljuks in 1064, or the battles between the Seljuks and the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia between the 12th and 14th centuries, were sometimes belittled, sometimes ignored, and sometimes presented as if there had been no battles. In some cases, these kingdoms were presented as “small,”
and in some cases their borders were made indistinct. Sometimes they were located outside of Anatolia, and other times it was said that the “Oguz, Pecenek, Kipcak tribes had arrived earlier” in the lands where Armenians lived. In this way, it was suggested that Armenians had no historical rights over Anatolia.

In the 1960’s and 1970’s, another development that showed that the Armenian taboo was a strong adhesive among the intellectuals was the movement known as “Blue Anatolia.” With the help of this fresh movement, according to which Anatolia was “ours not because we conquered it, but because it is ours,” the pagan, Christian, and Muslim histories of Anatolia were presented before, and “Turkishness” was presented as a version of the humanist thought. But among these societies or civilizations that constituted “us,” Armenians were not mentioned.

**TEXTBOOKS**

Starting from the 1980’s, a radical change occurred and the subject of the “Armenian issue” was introduced into the textbooks. This part was prepared in accordance with the 1953 book The Armenian Problem: Nine Questions, Nine Answers by Ahmet Esat Uras, who came from the Unionist movement and who even played a role in the deportations. The Turkish Foreign Ministry showed great interest in this book from the day it was published, and it was printed over and over again, and translated into foreign languages. According to it, Armenians, who were happily living in the Ottoman times and were being “assimilated in the Turkish culture,” suddenly adopted a hostile attitude towards Turks. In those years, the ruling elite was being “forced by the circumstances” to move forward into a period of disintegration during its last 150 years. Unending wars, defeats, and great losses of human life gave rise to deep anxieties about the fate of the empire. This period, while every attempt to prevent the empire from collapsing failed, the ruling elite tended to blame the imperialist forces and the “minorities” that collaborated with them. In those years, the ruling class of the empire thought that they were excluded from the historical narrative told by the West, that they were now “nobody,” and that they faced a complete destruction of the state. But they found consolation in the thought that it was essentially “the betrayal of the people that they were the masters of” that had caused this situation.

In this atmosphere, the ruling cadres of the new state believed that they could heal their wounds by leaving these dark pages of history behind. The year 1923 was a new beginning for them. The Turkish society saw itself as a Phoenix that was reborn from the ashes. And it was as if Armenians symbolized the “ashes” that they were reborn from. One other reason for not being willing to confront historical reality is the fear of punishment. Many Turks know that if they acknowledge the genocide, Turkey would have to pay compensation in the form of land and money for the compensation/repair of the plundered wealth of the Armenian who were deported. That was probably why Armenians had to be completely forgotten.

However, one must keep in mind that it is not only the Armenian Genocide but also the very recent past is almost forgotten. And because the Turkish society prefers to move forward without adequately addressing underlying conflicts, social tensions accumulate to the point where they become explosive.
The size and composition of the population of the Ottoman Empire has been disputed for over 100 years. The primary sources used to document the various assertions have included Ottoman government statistics, Armenian Patriarchate statistics and estimates by numerous contemporary observers—each with strengths and weaknesses. The subject of this article will be the Armenian Patriarchate statistics. Detailed records from the Patriarchate have largely been ignored to date. I aim to show that they can be used for meaningful analysis and are an indispensable resource.

BACKGROUND

The Armenian community in the Ottoman Empire maintained over 2,000 churches—the great majority Armenian Apostolic, but Catholic and Protestant as well. Baptisms, marriages and deaths were recorded, but almost all such records were destroyed during the genocide.

In addition to the recording of vital events, the church periodically undertook the task of enumerating the Armenian population via a census. The Armenian National Constitution (1862) created a census department within the Bureau of the Patriarchate. The census was used for taxation, as well as for determining representation in the national political and religious assemblies.

While scholars have made use of previously published summaries compiled from the census registers, actual registers have never been analyzed or even been known to exist. The absence of detailed records has led some to question how the summary tables were generated; however, some actual registers have survived.

Images 1 and 2 are pages from registers compiled in 1906/7 and 1913/4. Both samples are records for the same houses on Khan Street (Han) in the Mouhsine Khatoun (Muhsine Hatun) district.
of Istanbul. The registers are contained in the archives of the Patriarchate and were microfilmed by the Mormon Church.

ANALYSIS

The existence of the registers allows for a better understanding of how they were compiled, as well as of some of the strengths and weaknesses inherent in the summaries. What follows is only casual treatment, but hopefully it is enough to pique the curiosity of other researchers.

The first item to note is that the census was not a continuous register from which periodic summaries were tabulated. Each register does not appear to have been compiled simply by updating the previous register with the vital events occurring in the intervening years. A summary for the 1906/7 census for Pera indicates that the results were in fact summarized by street and district, and, thus, were the foundation for aggregation.

The column headings are district, street, number, first name, last name, occupation, father’s name, mother’s name, native city, and year of birth (note that the years of birth are according to the hijra calendar). The data and years collected correspond closely to the Ottoman registers. This raises some interesting questions given that Ottoman registers containing Armenians have not yet come to light.

Detailed data of this kind can be analyzed for quality and consistency. For instance, age misreporting is a common error found in censuses. Slightly better results are achieved by asking for the year of birth instead of age; yet, it is still common to observe heaping at years ending in certain digits. Table 1 is compiled from a sample of 2,300 individuals in the 1913/4 census:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEARS ENDING IN</th>
<th>MALES</th>
<th>FEMALES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is interesting to note that women displayed heaping in years ending in 0 and 6, while 5 and 6 were most common for men. These results are not sufficient to form conclusions as the heaping may result from actual events. For instance, a large number of people reported births in the years immediately following the 1877/8 Russo-Turkish War.

Table 2 summarizes the same sample into 5-year age groupings indicating an under-counting of children under the age of 10. Demographers have made use of stable population theory to estimate the degree of under-counting by comparing the enumerated population to standard model life tables.

Extreme care is called for, though, as such methods can easily lead to the masking or removing of the impact of actual events on the age structure of the population. It cannot be emphasized enough that one must understand the history of the region under analysis before conclusions can be drawn. That one must also understand the situations where stable population theory is applicable is also self-evident.

In the sample, males accounted for 51 percent of the total population. While superficially one might expect a 50/50 male to female ratio, it is difficult to interpret such results. Yet, it is known that Istanbul contained a large Armenian male migrant population. Possibly the ratio was further impacted by a greater natural female life expectancy or the massacres of the late 1800’s resulting in more male deaths than female. The tilt in the age structures implies greater female life expectancy; however, such conclusions are premature without further analysis.

Other areas open to exploration are the prevalence of certain occupations, the disparity in ages between spouses, the composition of households, the origin of the population by gender, etc. For instance, a conclusion drawn from producing the above tables was that husbands were generally significantly older than their wives.

It would be fascinating to explore the population by age, gender, and native city. Istanbul served as an economic center for Armenians, but in the last years of the empire this may not have
played as great a role as other cities and countries served as economic magnets for Armenians.

CONCLUSION

Population figures originating from the Armenian Patriarchate have come under harsh criticism, particularly from those who deny the Armenian Genocide and, thus, attempt to validate a much lower pre-genocide Armenian population.

That the Patriarchate underrepresented Muslims is problematic, yet the Patriarchate had no means of counting the Muslim population. Justin McCarthy accepts that Armenians were undercounted to a greater degree than Muslims, yet this has not diminished the value of Ottoman statistics in his analysis. While it is not known how the Patriarchate arrived at the Muslim population, it is clear that the Patriarchate had the incentive and means to enumerate the Armenian population and did so.*

We now have a glimpse into the process used by the Patriarchate to compile data on the Armenian population. In addition, the information available is in greater detail than previously known and, thus, allows for an assessment of quality and an easier comparison with other sources. Much tedious and technical work needs to be done, but from what is available thus far, it is apparent that the data presented by the Armenian Patriarchate is a valuable and required resource for analyzing the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire.

ENDNOTES


2 Outside of churches in Istanbul, the only known records I have personally worked with are the tax registers for the period 1902 through 1915 from the church of St. Gregory the Illuminator in Gesaria (Kayseri). In addition, some tax registers from the Van region have survived from the 1800’s. The archives at the Armenian Patriarchate in Istanbul may contain addition records.


4 McCarthy offers a number of criticisms, including the presumed absence of any records (Muslims and Minorities, pp. 47–57). McCarthy is also concerned that some of the figures have been rounded and were used for political objectives. He considers some problems “insoluble,” such as that population by age and sex were not published. In summary, McCarthy invalidates the Armenian Patriarchate statistics primarily on the inaccuracy in the estimate of the Muslim population. McCarthy exhibits a favorable bias toward Ottoman government statistics that often compromises his collective works.

5 An interesting study of Istanbul Muslim households was done by Alan Duben and Cem Behar in Istanbul Households: Marriage, Family and Fertility, 1880–1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Duben and Behar make use of Ottoman censuses. A valuable project would compare the results of the 1906/7 Ottoman census with the 1906/7 Armenian Patriarchate census, including a comparison of the registers for the same districts. Such a comparison may go a long way in understanding the controversy in population estimates.

6 Souren Papazian, Odyssey of a Survivor (Maryland: Jensen Press, 2002), p. 37. Beyond the known available census and vital records, Papazian describes his role in carrying out the 1913 census in the village of Havav in the district of Palu.
Interestingly, claims that the German ally had suggested the deportations stand in contradiction to these assumptions. The apparent contradiction would have been by and large resolved if assertions that the CUP had coordinated its March 1915 decision with the German ally were true. However, this claim is based on a misrepresentation of a key source and is thereby untenable.1 Other authors argue that the CUP decided on the Armenian Genocide several months later. In other words, the war was not the long awaited “opportunity” to commit genocide but an unforeseen disaster that created the environment for the decision and execution of the genocide.2

A relatively new addition to the debate is the issue of Ottoman population policies. Recent scholarship on the Armenian Genocide suggests that the crime has to be studied within the context of general Ottoman policies. The policies addressed competing claims to sovereignty primarily over Ottoman border areas. These claims were based on the presence of large non-Muslim and non-Turkish populations. Such potential threats to Ottoman territorial integrity could have been effectively overcome if it were possible to ethnically homogenize the whole empire or at least important strategic areas. Key Ottoman documentation on the Armenian Genocide shows that while deporting Armenians was a crucial government goal, using available resources taken from the deportees for settling Muslim refugees or immigrants was equally relevant. Thus, the Armenian Genocide was not simply a program of eliminating Armenian population concentrations; it was a campaign to replace Armenians with Muslim settlers who were considered to be reliable.3 But when exactly did demographic planning become a dominant consideration for the Ottoman government? The Ottoman Armenians were not the only non-Muslims that lived in strategically sensitive locations. Greeks, Zionists, and Syrian Christians inhabited similarly important districts. The Ministry of Interior coordinated the demographic policies and, most importantly, the deportations. Thus, the ministry’s files provide some insight into how these groups were targeted. Not surprisingly, at times the same officials who had dealt with other non-Muslim groups played a crucial role during the Armenian Genocide. Thus, the evolving population policy can be partly reconstructed, but some caution appears to be in place. Fundamental differences in the treatment of Armenians and other groups suggest that the government had singled out the Armenians for particularly cruel repression leading to large-scale annihilation. The Nestorian case is a good example for such considerations. The Ottoman Nestorian communities inhabited the Central Kurdish Taurus Mountains, today largely identical with the Turkish province of Hakkari and the Iraqi Amadiya district. They lived in remote valleys and earned their livelihood through subsistence agriculture and sheep and goat breeding. The isolated region facilitated
their efforts to maintain a comparably large degree of autonomy from government interference in communal affairs. Throughout 1914, the Ministry of Interior grew increasingly worried about Russian interest in local matters in the region. Agha Petros, a former Ottoman Nestorian agent, had gone over to the Russians and was promoting Russian interests in the mountains. In June 1914, some Nestorians had approached Russian representatives in Iran and requested arms in return for Nestorian military support. The Ottomans were aware of these contacts. On June 16, 1914, the Ministry of Interior warned the authorities at Van, Mosul, and Erzerum about the activities of a Russian officer who was working together with Agha Petros. Both men were active in the central Kurdish Taurus, one as a member of and the other as an interpreter for the international commission for the demarcation of the Iranian-Ottoman border. The men were allegedly working among the Kurds and Nestorians against the Ottoman government. The authorities were advised to take counter-measures and obstruct their activities.

The situation deteriorated rapidly after the start of the war in Europe in August 1914. Now, the Ottoman authorities began displacing Nestorian villages in the Bashkale region. Brutalities against Nestorians triggered revenge attacks on Muslim villages across the border in Iran. The result was a wave of displacements affecting Christian and Muslim villages on both sides of the border. Christians were forced to leave for Iran, while Kurds were expelled to Ottoman territory. But worse was to come.

Taner Akcam observed that military objectives were, among others, one reason for the deportations. An example was “the forced emigrations of Nestorians and Assyrians from the Van region at the end of 1914.” Stating that, for “example, in September 1914, from the areas closest to Iran, the Nestorians who were ripe for provocation from outside were settled into Ankara and Konya. In order to prevent them from creating a community in their new locations, they were settled in Muslim-dominated areas with strict orders that their settlements must not exceed twenty residences in number.” In other words, the security concerns that had led to what was believed to be preemptive attacks on Nestorian villages along the Iranian border had turned into the full-scale deportation of a community.

David Gaunt studied the episode in more detail and gives the right date for the deportation decision, namely, Oct. 26, 1914, and not September 1914. Clearly, the decision has to be seen in close connection with the pending Ottoman attack on Russia that occurred on Oct. 29, 1914. Having provided a correct context, Gaunt argues that the “Ottoman government was disturbed by doubts about Nestorians’ loyalty and was concerned over the possibility that more of them would move into Iran and join the self-defense units established by the Russians.” Therefore, the Nestorians were deported to central Asia Minor. Gaunt rightly stresses that the plan intended the assimilation of the Nestorians and thereby the destruction of their culture. Three days later, another document showed that the order had been extended to the Nestorians living in and around the district of present-day Hakkari city. However, the provincial authorities had advised the government that they lacked the necessary forces to execute the order. In response, the central government was forced to postpone the deportations. Instead, it ordered the close surveillance of the Nestorians until the latter could be deported. By Nov. 5, 1914, the anticipated Nestorian unrest had not materialized. Thus, Talat postponed the deportations until a time when military necessity would render the measure imperative. Until that time, the government deemed it sufficient to keep the situation under surveillance. In other words, the deportation did not take place. The plan had been an ad-hoc security measure. It was shelved once it became clear to the Ottoman central authorities that their worst fear had been unfounded. In 1915, however, the persecution of Nestorians took more brutal forms during the Ottoman retreat from Iran when Nestorians were massacred alongside Kurdish suspects.

The episode demonstrates that by 1914, deportation was again a potential tool for repressive policies. Such deportations would be limited in scale. However, military concerns were paramount and the direction of front line troops was not acceptable. Therefore, the Nestorian deportation plan was postponed and not taken up again. During the Armenian Genocide, deportation was a primary policy object that justified the deployment of resources that could have been used for front-line or other service. While documentation from Ottoman archival sources is still limited and incomplete, a careful review of the available evidence is indispensable. Otherwise, authors run the danger of creating trajectories of events that are incorrect.

ENDNOTES


5 Ibid., pp. 201-202.

6 DHL.SFR 42-44, Minister to Mosul, Van, Erzerum provinces, June 16, 1914, Special Dept. 255, 241, 32.


10 DHL.SFR 46-102, Minister to Van province, Oct. 29, 1914, EUM Spec. 107.

Like elsewhere in the Western world, the 1890’s massacres, forced Islamization, and displacement of hundreds of thousands of Ottoman Armenians during the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II had a significant impact on public opinion in Scandinavia. Some would defend the Sultan and deny or downplay the events, often by using anti-Armenian stereotypes. But condemnation of the massacres, whether based on notions of Christian solidarity or human rights, seems to have been more widespread. Papers and public figures raised awareness of the atrocities and their human and political implications, laying the foundation for the substantial missionary and relief work that would last through the Armenian Genocide and its immediate and long-term aftermath.

To name a few examples: Secular, Danish-Jewish intellectuals Georg Brandes and Age Meyer Benedictsen decried European indifference to the sufferings of Armenians and founded Danske Armeniervenner (Danish Friends of Armenians or DA). From the other end of the spectrum, Danish bishop and Minister of Cultural Affairs H. V. Styhr in 1897 denounced Abdulhamid’s “holy war of extermination.” Shortly after 1900, Ottoman intellectuals Pierre Anmeghian and Ali Nouri Bey (a Swedish convert and Ottoman ex-diplomat Gustaf Noring), friends united in opposition to Abdulhamid’s autocratic rule, set up base and published books in Denmark and Sweden. In Norway, the paper “Nordlands Avis,” published on Oct. 4, 1900, would sarcastically sum up the feelings of quite a few Scandinavians on what was seen as Western indifference to the sufferings of Armenians:

“Who, then, should help, and who would spend a dime on a people that cannot be profited from. We are far from the jubilant time of the 20s, when philhellenism forced the Turkish murderers to release the Greek from his bloodstained fingers. … The Russian torments the Finn and the Turk murders the Armenian. … No one complains except for the oppressed. The Holy Alliance is yet again in place between the mighty in Europe, the alliance that allows each to eat his people and where no one must disturb the other while he eats. The conscience in Europe is dead. Long live imperialism. Long live nationalism. Hurrah for greed, and woe to those who oppose the Stock Exchange Committee of the bourse.”

Some, especially women missionaries, went further. The most important Scandinavian missionary effort directed at aiding and proselytizing among Ottoman Armenians was in fact to a large...
degree coordinated between the Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish Women Missionary Workers (in Danish: Kvindelige Misjons Arbejdere or KMA). Founded in Sweden in 1894, KMA branched out to Denmark in 1900 and Norway in 1902. Though run as independent, national NGOs, the branches widely shared values (like “women working for women”), goals, mission fields, educational facilities, etc., and they usually relied on cooperation with similar U.S. and German organizations. The first KMA orphanage, “Emaus,” was established 1903. It was run mainly by Danes, but the orphans were sponsored by individuals and groups from all of Scandinavia and Finland. A rather unique figure in this context is Danish teacher and relief worker Karen Jeppe, DA's only “field worker,” who would witness the execution of the genocide in Urfa. Jeppe and DA were critical of the ideology of organizations like KMA, focused exclusively on aid and education to Armenians, and did not attempt to convert Ottoman Muslims or Christians.

WITNESSING GENOCIDE: THE VIEW FROM ANATOLIA

When the empire joined World War I, some Scandinavians were willing and able to stay in Anatolia. Here, missionaries were in ideal positions to witness the execution of the genocide, rescue survivors from massacres, death marches, and forced assimilation, and gather survivor testimonies. Perhaps the best-known Scandinavian account of such events is the diaries of Maria Jacobsen, a Danish KMA missionary nurse posted in the region of Mamouret-ul-Aziz (Kharput/Harput). During World War I, she also wrote a series of letters to KMA's Armenia Committee. Due to censorship, Westerners could usually not state outright what they witnessed. Instead, they used code and euphemisms, like when Jacobsen wrote that “The gates of Heaven are wide open and many are entering,” and referred to the first plague of Egypt—the water turned into blood—to explain why missionaries could not go to Lake Goljuk, a large massacre site in 1915, as they used to in the summer. At one point she did manage, with German help, to smuggle out uncensored letters in Danish describing in detail the horrible conditions for surviving Armenians in the Mezreh and Kharput towns.

Hansine Marcher, Danish KMA, worked directly for the German “Deutsche Hulfsbund” (DH) as leader of a girl school in Mezreh, and was used as a source for the Bryce-Toynbee report. She wrote a book in 1919 that includes survivor testimonies and an account of the period from March 1916 when she left the empire with German missionary Clara Pfeiffer via Diyarbekir, Urfa, Aleppo, and Constantinople. Here, Marcher describes how they passed through the area around Lake Goljuk, seeing countless skeletons, bones, skulls, and pieces of clothing from Armenian deportees—men, women and children—massacred there. In Diyarbekir, the only Armenians she saw were children who were servants or slaves of local Turks, were given Turkish names, and forced to speak only Turkish. She also witnessed how the Armenian Apostolic cathedral had been turned into an auction room for stolen Armenian goods.

At a KMA meeting after her return, it was said about her that “perhaps none of our Sisters over there have suffered more from the systematic extermination of the [Armenian] people, as she has seen her whole school work destroyed and all of her pupils take leave, wailing and crying, to depart with the expellees.”

A third Danish KMA missionary, Karen Marie Petersen, ran “Emaus” in Mezreh. She collected survivor testimonies from 1915 onward, and witnessed death marches and an area littered with the remains of Armenians. The fourth Danish KMA missionary in the region, Jenny Jensen, ran the DH orphanage “Emaus” in Mezreh. She left the empire in 1918 after the Ottoman authorities had requisitioned “Emaus” to use as a military hospital, meaning that she had to rent five houses to shelter the 200 girls that were supposedly under German protection. Jensen had severe difficulties in getting permission to leave the empire, which was made even harder as she tried to bring with her an orphan, Margaret Atamjan, the sole survivor of the genocide in her family. In 1916, Marcher had similar problems as the Ottoman military authorities were unwilling to let persons from “the inner provinces” leave the country or even go to the capital.

This was a general problem. In a February 1919 report, Carl Ellis Wandel, a Danish diplomatic minister at Constantinople, describes the difficulties he had with assisting Danes:

“Of Danish missionaries and nurses in Asiatic Turkey there are now only two left [Jacobsen and Petersen]. During 1918 two left for Denmark [Jensen and Jeppe]. But it was only after considerable difficulties that the legation succeeded in getting them the necessary travel permits from the Turkish police as it seems like they had received orders from the military authorities not to visa the two Danish ladies' passports until they had spent some months in Constantinople. It might also have played a certain role that both of the ladies came from Armenia where they had witnessed events that [the Ottoman authorities] did not want to be known in Europe.”

Jacobsen and Petersen decided to stay to the end. They, and their organization, believed that if they left, the Armenians they protected would probably not survive. A further problem for those wanting to publicize the destruction of the Armenians was that monitoring was not confined to mail sent from the empire. At a March 1917 meeting, Professor Nyholm, chairman of the Danish Eastern Mission (Osterlandsmissionen or OM), advised Danish KMA’s Armenia Committee not to go public with pleas for funds to missionaries and Armenian survivors in the Kharput region. This would direct attention to “our Sisters over there.” OM had learned that their journal was known and read by the Ottoman authorities, and they feared that public statements about events in the empire would make the continuation of missionary work difficult after the war.

At an earlier stage, on Feb. 1, 1916, DH director Friedrich Schuchardt had likewise warned Danish KMA against going public with their knowledge of the genocide. Schuchardt had just returned from Constantinople, describing how he had tried in vain to gain access to Enver Pasha and other leading figures to speak on behalf of the Armenians, and how he was constantly monitored. He had talked to German senior officers who stated that “if the public knew even one tenth of what they knew of what had been going on it would generate general terror, but unfortunately it turned out over and over again that as soon as public protests were raised in Europe against the actions of the Turks, this
only spurred them on to commit new atrocities and to seek even more to exterminate the whole of the miserable people."

Wandel had already in January 1915 reported on how he was pressured to make the Danish press be more favorable to the empire:

“In the course of a conversation I had yesterday with the acting Turkish Foreign Minister, Grand Vizier Prince Said Halim, His Highness complained about the unfriendliness that is being expressed in the Danish press toward the government here. ‘Clippings from Danish papers are being sent to me,’ said the Grand Vizier, ‘wherefrom it appears that many unpleasant things are being said about us by you [Denmark].’ I answered that I had not noticed anything like that, and that I found the tone in the Danish papers that I read so neutral and impartial that I could not even find in these any expression of either antipathy against or excessive sympathy for any of the warring parties. There could not be said to be any ill will against Turkey in Denmark. I have not been able to find out from where the clippings that His Highness mentions originate.”

Thus, even returning Westerners could not speak freely, like some Scandinavian and U.S. missionaries coming from the empire to or via Denmark who reported directly to KMA’s Armenia Committee in Copenhagen. The minutes of the oral report of Norwegian KMA missionary Thora von Wedel-Jarlsberg, dated Oct. 16, 1915, describe how Armenians from Erzinjan or further to the north were massacred—shot or thrown from the mountains into the river—by Turks and Kurds in the nearby Euphrates Valley. Six orphan boys that Wedel-Jarlsberg and her German colleague Eva Elvers tried to protect were taken by Turkish soldiers and shot. After the missionaries had been forced out of Erzinjan by the authorities and were on their way to Constantinople, they witnessed daily what Wedel-Jarlsberg describes as “new horrors” and “one group after the other led from the villages to be killed.”

Similarly, on Dec. 7, 1915, Swedish KMA missionary Alma Johansson related the experiences of herself and Norwegian KMA colleague Bodil Biorn a report published in a confidential seven-page booklet that was distributed among Danish KMA members. The booklet explicitly mentions the mass killings of Armenians they witnessed in Mush and the Kharpert region where they stayed with the Danish missionaries after having been expelled from Mush, killings that were part of the “complete extermination” of the Armenians. The fear of endangering missionaries, surviving Armenians, and what was envisioned as the continued persecution of the Armenian people—what was the ultimate goal of the CUP—was so great that even in a confidential booklet the initials of the missionaries’ first names were used.

Incidentally, Danes also had direct access to an account of the rationale behind the CUP’s xenophobic ideology by Djevad Bey, the Ottoman diplomatic minister in Copenhagen and a career diplomat closely connected to the CUP. In a February 1916 interview in “Politiken,” he stated among other things that “[w]e have now introduced the Turkish language in Turkey. This is the first result of a national awakening: Turkey for the Turks.”

The View from Constantinople

In the Ottoman capital, Wandel was kept informed of the destruction of the Armenians by other diplomats; members of the Ottoman establishment; Western eyewitnesses; and Ottoman Christian circles. He also witnessed local persecutions of Armenians, as stated in a September 1915 report: “Everything here in Constantinople Armenians are kidnapped and sent to Asia, and it is not possible to get information of their whereabouts.” That same month, whatever doubt he had concerning the ultimate goal of the CUP had disappeared, as can be seen in his detailed report on “the cruel intent of the Turks, to exterminate the Armenian people.” His Swedish colleague, Ankarsvard, expressed a similar view in a July 6, 1915 report:

“...the persecutions of the Armenians have taken on appalling proportions, and everything points toward the idea that the Young Turks have wanted to take advantage of the opportunity where, for various reasons, no effective pressure from the outside needs to be feared to once and for all terminate the Armenian question. The method is simple enough and consists of the extermination of the Armenian nation...”

Another Swedish diplomat, military attaché Einar af Wirsen, recalled in his 1942 memoirs a conversation he had with Talat Pasha in October 1915, during which the CUP leader had commented on a report that 800,000 Armenians had been killed, saying, “I assure you, this is not true, it was only 600,000.”
Bjornlund

Wandel also received reports from eyewitnesses (kept anonymous in his reports) of the continuation of the genocide in 1916 through massacre, disease, and the starvation of hundreds of thousands of Armenians. A Hungarian gentleman reported that he had travelled through large stretches covered with Armenian bodies, estimating that more than 300,000 Armenians had been killed in Mesopotamia. And a German priest who had just arrived in Constantinople from Damascus had witnessed “incredible horrors,” stating that a large part of the deported Armenians died of starvation as they were sent to areas where no food was available and left to their own fate.

Many Scandinavian figures and accounts deserving mention have been left out of this brief overview. But it should be clear that the Armenian genocide was widely reported and condemned in Scandinavia as the event unfolded. To conceptualize the destruction, Swedish politician Hjalmar Branting (1917) and Danish scholar Age Meyer Benedictsen (1925) would even use the term “folkmord/folkemord” (“the murder of a people”), a term used today to denote or translate the later term “genocide.”

ENDNOTES
2 For a partial exception, see Bertil Bengtsson, Svartets Ar: Om Folkmordet pa de kristne i Turkiet 1894–1922 (Sodertalje: Syrianska Riksforbundet 2004) on the Christian genocides. See also Alma Johansson, Ett folk i landsflykt: Ett ar ur armeniernas historia (Stockholm: KMA 1930); www.statsarkivet.no/webfelles/armenia/english.html.
3 Pierre Amoghan, Visions Scandinaves (Copenhagen: Hoost & Soon, 1903); Ali Nouri Bey, Abdul-Hamid i Karikatur: Interioorer fra Yildiz (Kopenhagen: V. Pio’s Boghandel, 1903). The former is a collection of poems in French, many dedicated to Scandinavians with an interest in the “Armenian cause” and critical of Abdulhamid’s rule, e.g., Norwegian Bjoornstjerne Bjoornson. The latter is a collection of caricature and verse ridiculing Abdulhamid and condemning, e.g., the Armenian massacres.
4 e.g., protocol of Armenian women and children taken in at “Emaus” during the genocide: KMA, 10.360, p. 112; “Protokol over Plejeboern i Bornehemmet Emaus” i Meereh. 1909–17.
5 e.g., Bjornlund, “A fate...”
7 e.g., KMA, 10.360, “1912–1921,” intro. to 1915 meetings; ibid., March 3, 1916.
13 Ibid., pp. 16–17.
17 Margarit was later brought to Denmark by Jøppe.
25 Fra Armenien, KMA, no date (1916).
27 Maurice Francis Egan, Ten Years near the German Frontier: A Retrospect and a Warning (New York: George H. Doran Co., 1919), p. 312.
29 e.g., information on the genocide in Kharper in letters written by Danish missionaries, and delivered by a German physician: UM, 139. N. 1., “Armenien,” [unnumbered], April 10, 1917.
31 Ibid.
33 Ibid., p. 80.
34 UM, 139. N. 1., no. LIV, March 10, 1916.

Hrant Minassian
BORN: Constantinople; 1901
DIED: Lexington, Mass.; 2005

Nelly (Dashikozian) Minassian
BORN: Rodosto; 1909
DIED: Lexington, Mass; 2005

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Organizing Oblivion in the Aftermath of Mass Violence

If the Party could thrust its hand into the past and say of this or that event, it never happened—that, surely, was more terrifying than mere torture and death.1

By Ugur Umit Ungor

Over the last decades, there has been an upsurge in the study of memory. Scholars have studied how memory, especially historical narrative, is produced, consumed, transformed, and transmitted by social groups. This burgeoning field of research has yielded a large amount of knowledge about the nature of memory and mass violence.2 In the context of mass violence, memory bears special significance as perpetrating regimes always seek to control, destroy, and prohibit a range of memorial practices related to the violence. One commentator on the relationship between memory and mass violence is Tzvetan Todorov, who identified at least two strategies that totalitarian dictatorships have used to manage and control memory: the erasure of the traces of the crimes and the intimidation of the population. Both of these policies include the control over knowledge, for example the prohibition of collecting and spreading information.3 Paul Connerton’s analysis of how totalitarian regimes have used memory as a tool of power is noteworthy:

“The attempt to break definitively with an older social order encounters a kind of historical deposit and threatens to founder upon it. The more total the aspirations of the new regime, the more imperiously will it seek to introduce an era of forced forgetting...A particularly extreme case of such interaction occurs when a state apparatus is used in a systematic way to deprive its citizens of their memory. All totalitarianisms behave in this way; the mental enslavement of the subjects of a totalitarian regime begins when their memories are taken away.”

In totalitarian dictatorships, undoubtedly the most violent regimes throughout the 20th century, the democratic dissemination of narratives and the free exercise of memorial practices is prohibited. Instead, the population is enveloped in a cognitive system of official propaganda including the denial and cover-up of the regime’s atrocities. The famous works of George Orwell, Primo Levi, and Milan Kundera are but three examples of literary representation of memory control under Nazism and communism.5

The decade from 1912 to 1922 saw unprecedented levels of mass violence in the Ottoman Empire. War, genocide, forced migration, famine, flight and displacement had deeply affected the fabric of society and scarred the memory of all participants and witnesses. After so much violence in the Ottoman territories, it was only logical that hundreds of thousands of people were physically wounded and psychologically traumatized. Demobilized soldiers came home with frightening stories of mass death, entire neighborhoods had been emptied, families had lost their male populations, widows were begging by the roadside, miserable orphans were roaming the streets naked. Despite the self-healing ability of families and communities, the violence had caused severe lasting damage to the psychological development of the region and society at large. But in comparison to Nazi Germany (1933–1945) and Stalinist Russia (1924–1953), the study of their contemporary, the Young Turk dictatorship (1913–1950), has lagged behind in empirical treatment, theoretical analyses, and normative assessment. Research on Young Turk memorial practices are no exception to this rule. This article will draw on examples from Diyarbekir province in an attempt to problematize the memory-scape of the Young Turk regime and argue that it is characterized by silencing—not only of their perpetration of mass violence but also of their victimization.
acknowledging statehood, the Armenians and Syriacs were not accorded the same treatment as Greeks. They were either deeply traumatized survivors living in wretched refugee camps or terrified individuals keeping a low profile in ruined villages. The Kemalist regime continued the CUP policy of effacing physical traces of Armenian existence on all fronts: Architecture was defaced, destroyed, and rid of engravings. Although the Armenians were gone, in a sense they were still deemed too visible. In Diyarbakir city, an important stage of the erasure of memory was the razing of its Armenian cemeteries. One of the main men who were responsible for the destruction of the local Armenians, Mutfuzade Abdurrahman Seref Ulug (1892–1976), who had become mayor after 1923, ordered the erasure of one of the city’s last vanishing Armenian landmarks two decades after the genocide. That this was not merely a function of “urban modernization” but a willful expunction of the Other’s memory appeared from the fact that not only on the west side (where “modernization” was carried out) but also on the east side of town, Armenian cemeteries were either willfully neglected into oblivion, outright flattened, or used as paving stones for floors or roads. Obviously, no relative ever had a say in this process, since most deportees and survivors were peasants living undercover or in Syria. Another critical event that marked the erasure of memory was the collapse of the church, Sourp Giragos. In the 1960’s, the roof collapsed into the deserted building and in subsequent decades the structure languished, was stripped of its assets, and neglected into misery.

For the same reasons, the Diyarbakir Armenians had no chance of writing and publishing memoirs. Thus, the production of memory among them did not take off until much later or until the next generation(s). The killing and displacement brought by Young Turk rule created an archipelago of nuggets of memory spread across the world. Well before groups of survivors could formulate narratives about what had happened, a master narrative was being constructed by the perpetrators. In one of his speeches in parliament, Interior Minister Sukru Kaya (1883–1959) asserted that:

“...it has been the livelihood of certain politicians to foster the notion that there is an eternal enmity between Turks and Armenians...Turks and Armenians, forced to pursue their true and natural interests, again instinctively felt friendliness towards each other. This is the truth of the matter...From our perspective the cordiality expressed by the Armenian nation towards us has not diminished.”

Such an assessment of Turkish-Armenian relations in the wake of the genocide (nota bene by one of its organizers) was to be expected only from a political elite pursuing a distinct memorial agenda. Ever since its rise to power, the Kemalist dictatorship continued the CUP policy of suppressing all information on the 1915 genocide. When the regime caught wind of the memoirs of Karabet Tapiykan, subtitled “What we saw during the deportation from Sivas to Aleppo” (Boston: Hairenik, 1924) the book was prohibited from entering Turkey for “containing very harmful writings.” Marie Sarrafian Banker, a graduate of the Izmir American College, had written her memoirs in 1936. Her book, too, was prohibited entry to the country. All existing copies were ordered confiscated and destroyed for containing “harmful texts.” When Arman Anoosh, an Armenian survivor living in Aleppo, wrote his memoirs titled The history of a ruined city: Urfa, the volume was prohibited from entry and existing copies that had found their way into the country were ordered confiscated.

At times the policy extended beyond the prohibition of genocide memoirs and included “normal” history books. When Turkish customs intercepted Arshak Alboyajian’s classic two-volume History of Armenian Kayseri (1937), sent from Syria to Istanbul by surface mail, it was ordered confiscated, destroyed, and prohibited. An Armenian-language book published in Cairo in 1940 on the small town of Bahcecik was prohibited simply for the fact that it produced a history of a region that fell under Turkish national jurisdiction. What is striking about these prohibitions is that they generally limited themselves to the Turkish Republic. For the regime it did not matter much that Armenians wrote and circulated memoirs among themselves—as long as memory was produced and consumed within an Armenian milieu and did not trickle back into Turkey. One of the exceptions to this rule was the September 1935 incident between the United States and Turkey over plans by Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer to film Franz Werfel’s novel The Forty Days of Musa Dagh. After strong diplomatic pressure from the Turkish embassy, the idea was abandoned. The Young Turks had already officially prohibited the book itself in January 1935, a year after the Nazis. The same fate befell Paul du Véou’s less fictional book on the Musa Dagh Armenians on the eve of the Turkish annexation of Hatay province. That book, too, was blacklisted and barred from entry to the country. The regime did not want these narratives to enter local history and memory, on which they claimed a strict monopoly.

All in all, the mass violence of the first decades of the 20th century was repressed and ousted from public memory through silence, amnesia, and repression, rather than reflection, discussion, processing, and memorialization. What is striking about this process is the fact that the violence that was repressed was not only that in which the Young Turks had been perpetrators, but also that in which they...
The construction of memory

The Turkish nation-state that was constructed after 1913 needed, as all nation-states, national myths. According to Ana Maria Alonso, “power and memory are most intimately embraced in the representations of official histories which are central to the production and reproduction of hegemony.” These official histories are prepared for “creating a usable past, which is a hallmark for collective memory.” Nationalist political elites in particular have used official histories to craft the nation-state’s memory to their desire as historians are often appointed by the regime to this end.

The function of these new histories is the construction of a logic of a “national narrative,” of which Victor Roudometof defines four characteristics: First, the narrative is a “quest for origins” according to which the researcher’s task is to trace the beginnings of a people as far back in history as possible. Second, it aims to construct continuity among the different historical periods, thereby showing the preservation of the culture, tradition, and mentality of the nation. Third, it seeks to identify periods of glory and decline, showing the preservation of the culture, tradition, and mentality of the nation. Under the title “Stories about the foundation of this city,” Gunkut reviewed nine historical narratives about the “origins” of the city: the Akkadian, Persian, Assyrian, Arab, Parthian, Greek, Armenian, Hitite, and Turkish theses. The author evaluated all myths and dismissed, with increasing severity, disapproval, and contempt, one by one, the first eight theories. For example, according to Gunkut, “the claim that Amid was founded by Arabs can be nothing else than a lie, a ludicrous fabrication by arabs and arabophiles.” Out of disdain, the names of non-Turkish ethnic groups were consciously and consistently written not with a capital but with a small letter: The literature spoke not of Kurds, Arabs, and Armenians, but of kurds, arabs, and armenians. As a grand finale, Gunkut repeated the Young Turk mantra: “Diyarbakir city has never lost its Turkishness, its National Existence and has always remained Turkish.”

After ignoring six centuries of Ottoman history, Gunkut left straight to the first decades of the 20th century. His historical portrait of the Young Turk era of violence was most striking. In a region in which more than 100,000 Armenians were destroyed, this author pioneered the denial of the genocide: “In the Great War, this region was saved from Russian invasions and armenian massacres and arson.” With the massacres of the 1925 Kurdish conflict only a decade ago, Gunkut’s narrative on that episode of mass violence was more elaborate. The Kurdish resistance to the regime was almost exclusively attributed to conspiracies from outside: Its leader Shaikh Said (1865–1925) was portrayed not as a member of the Kurdish intelligentsia or elite but as “an extremely ignorant fanatic...who became the tool of foreigners...with several other uncultured vagabonds.” The narrative then took a turn towards misinformation as Gunkut argued that the Kurds had “committed bloodcurdling atrocious acts in Lice and Silvan,” where they had purportedly “monstrously dismembered young Turkish patriots.” In this remarkable reversal of the historical account, all violence in Diyarbekir had been committed by the Armenians and Kurds against the Turks. Misrepresentation could only be called so if there was a body of knowledge to counteract it. Whatever counter-narratives were being produced abroad in any language, the Young Turks did not allow them to compete for consumption by the population. Especially when it came to the violence, the dictatorship held hegemony over memory politics and debates over the past.

With its obviously varied architecture, Diyarbekir needed symbolization and discourse for the retrospective “Turkification” of its cityscape as well. Gunkut went on to claim that the city of Diyarbekir area is the Turkish nation. He did not deviate from the party line when portraying the myths of origin: “Despite temporary invasions and destructions by the Assyrian, Persian, Greek, and Roman regimes, the great Turkish race has always lived in this country.” Through the lens of this particular foundational myth, the origin of Turkish culture was located so early in history that it was lost in the mists of not real but mythic time, which symbolized the timeless of the nation. Under the title “Stories about the foundation of this city,” Gunkut reviewed nine historical narratives about the “origins” of the city: the Akkadian, Persian, Assyrian, Arab, Parthian, Greek, Armenian, Hitite, and Turkish theses. The author evaluated all myths and dismissed, with increasing severity, disapproval, and contempt, one by one, the first eight theories. For example, according to Gunkut, “the claim that Amid was founded by Arabs can be nothing else than a lie, a ludicrous fabrication by arabs and arabophiles.” Out of disdain, the names of non-Turkish ethnic groups were consciously and consistently written not with a capital but with a small letter: The literature spoke not of Kurds, Arabs, and Armenians, but of kurds, arabs, and armenians. As a grand finale, Gunkut repeated the Young Turk mantra: “Diyarbakir city has never lost its Turkishness, its National Existence and has always remained Turkish.”

had been victims. A whole century of Ottoman-Muslim victimization in the Balkans, in particular during the severely traumatizing Balkan wars, was dismissed and forgotten in favor of “looking towards the future” and amicable inter-state relations with neighboring countries. The Young Turks assumed that society and man himself are completely malleable, that no crums of memories remain after shock and trauma, and that people can and will forget. After all, they themselves had tried to bury the unpleasant memories that would come to haunt Turkey decades later. Those minorities who were victimized by their regime, such as the Armenians, Kurds, and Syrians, did not have a chance at healing their wounds or memorializing their losses. The new memory of the nation did not permit cracks, nuances, shades, subtleties, or any difference for that matter. Much like the new identity, it was total, absolute, and unitary.
Orthodox church which was converted to a mosque following the Muslim capture of Diyarbekir in 639 AD. He attacked noted Ottoman historians, observers, and travelers such as Evliya Celebi for noting that the minaret had been a bell tower, concluding, “In short, no matter how one interprets this, it is not likely but absolutely certain that this mosque was built by the Turks.” Although Gunkut simply ignored the Syrian Orthodox and Chaldean churches, and Jewish synagogues of Diyarbekir, his depiction of Armenian heritage was most radical: “Above all, I can state with absolute certainty that nowhere in the entire city there is even a single trace of armenianness to be found.”

DISCUSSION

This article discussed how the Young Turks silenced the violence in the politics of memory they pursued during their dictatorship. By meting out a new identity for the country, the Young Turks also needed to mete out a new memory for it. During the 1920s and especially 1930’s, the Young Turk treatment of the past ranged from the organization of oblivion regarding the traumatic past and construction of an official narrative that included heroic and eternalized images of the nation. All throughout the country, but particularly in the eastern provinces, orders were given to write new local histories. These official textbooks, nationalist canons, and city histories did not only impose broad silences on critical historical issues, but they banished all ethnic minorities out of (regional) histories. The significance of Young Turk hegemony in memory politics cannot be overstated. In a peasant society where illiteracy figures were as high as 80 percent, the official texts were not only the first ones the population would read, they were also the only ones available to the population. The organization of a hegemonic canon through exclusion and inclusion aimed at the formation of a “closed circuit of knowledge.” This act precluded the possibilities of a participatory memory and identity formation, especially in the eastern provinces. The regime warded off both external penetration and internal criticism of their belief system by banning and destroying texts on a scale perhaps only matched by the Soviet dictatorship.

“Turkishness” was measured by the level of exposure to that body of knowledge as subsequent studies of cities and regions were to quote the “classics” of Young Turk historiography in order to be “scientific” enough to be allowed to be published.

Memory is closely linked to identity as every identity requires a memory. By mass educating several generations of citizens, the memory that the regime instilled in official Turkish identity became relatively solidified. A “recivilizing process” of unlearning Young Turk culture and memory such as in Germany never took place after the Young Turk dictatorship lost power in 1950. Therefore, the Armenian-Turkish conflict is very much a conflict of memory: Armenians wish to remember a history that Turks would like to forget. This would not have been a problem if memory was not a core component of identity. Therefore, loss of memory entails a loss of identity, something fundamentally problematic for many people. Since these constructed memories are a prime component of group identity, both Armenians and Turks experience any deviation of that memory as a direct attack on their very identity. Turks who express a sincere, agnostic interest in history are accused of having a dubious (read: Armenian) ethnic background. Then, according to the paradigm of nationalism, any deviation from the official memory automatically implies a deviation from the identity, which in its turn disturbs social closure in the group. A conflict of absolutely exclusive memories has expanded to a conflict of absolutely exclusive identities. “Turkey denies the Armenian Genocide” goes a jingle in genocide studies. Indeed, the Turkish Republic’s memory politics towards the Armenian Genocide was and is characterized by denial. But, not unlike the genocide itself too was part of a larger campaign, namely to exercise all violence from the memory of society. This imposition of collective amnesia on Turkish society was a double-edged sword. The Young Turks never commemorated and memorialized the massive tragedy of their expulsion from the Balkans but chose to move on and look towards the future. Here, too, silences were imposed on society: no sane Turk would dare to call Mustafa Kemal a refugee from Salonika, which he was nevertheless. Moreover, Turks do not perceive Macedonia or Epirus as the Germans view Prussia or Silesia. There is relatively little nostalgic tourism and Turkish nationalism in principle excludes claims on territories beyond the borders of the Republic. It remains a challenge to describe this process of amnesia and explain why this was the case, but one can sketch at least one ominous scenario of counter-factual history with reference to this issue. The call for Turkey to remember the past, captured in Santayana’s now hackneyed dictum that those who forget the past are condemned to repeat it, needs to be uttered with care. It might be argued that Turkey’s interwar burial of the past was a blessing in disguise that facilitated neutrality during World War II. The example of Germany, another country that had lost territories as a result of losing World War I, could have easily found a pendant in a bitter and vindictive Turkish-nationalist offensive on the Balkans, the Caucasus, or the Middle East—depending on what side Turkey would be on. In the age of total war and mass violence against civilians, this is a sequence of events that was fortunately spared the population of those regions.

The most powerful symbol of the silences imposed on the mass violence of the Young Turk era must be the strongly fortified citadel in the northeastern corner of Diyarbekir city. Many urbanites and neighboring peasants revere this ancient redoubt as one of the most important historical monuments of their country. The stronghold stands on a small elevation overlooking a meander in the Tigris River. It is impressive if only because of its position: both the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic built their state apparatus in the compound to instill a long lasting deference. Anyone who comes here, enticed by one or another historical narrative, is at least vaguely familiar with Diyarbekir’s record of violence and assumes history to be dormant within these dark, crumbling walls. The compound shelters the governorship, the provincial court, and most notably the infamous Diyarbekir prison. The latter building might be considered as the single landmark of mass violence in Diyarbekir: In it, Bulgarian revolutionaries were incarcerated in the late 19th century, Armenian elites were tortured and murdered in 1915, Shaikh Said and his men were sentenced and executed in 1925, various left-wing activists and Kurdish nationalists were kept and subjected to torture during the junta regime following the 1980 military coup, and PKK members were tortured and frequently killed in the 1990’s. Up to the year 2000, it housed the security forces of the Turkish war
machine including gendarmerie intelligence operatives and special counter-guerrilla militias. This sad account of Diyarbekir’s central prison reflects the city’s century of violence, during which at no time was any of the violence commemorated in any way at any of the sites. In the summer of 2007, the area had been cleared of security forces—and was being converted by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism to an open-air “Ataturk Museum.” The future of the past remains silent.

ENDNOTES
5 Primo Levi, I sommersi e i salvati (Torino: Einaudi, 1986); Milan Kundera, Kniha smichu a zapomneni (Prague: Vydavatel’stvi Literatura, 1974).
6 A recent volume dealing with this subject, although a notable exception, does not deal with the treatment of memory by the Young Turk regime itself: Esra Ozyurek (ed.), The Politics of Public Memory in Turkey (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2008).
9 For similar process of dislocated memory, see Pamela Ballinger, “Ataturk Museum.” The future of the past remains silent.
11 For a website commemorating Sourp Giragos, see www.surpgiragos.com.
13 For a website commemorating Sourp Giragos, see www.surpgiragos.com.
15 For similar process of dislocated memory, see Pamela Ballinger, “Ataturk Museum.” The future of the past remains silent.
18 For a website commemorating Sourp Giragos, see www.surpgiragos.com.
21 Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arsivî (Republican Archives, Ankara, hereafter BCA), 030.18.01.02/46.49.5, Prime Ministry decree, June 10, 1934.
22 BCA, 030.18.01.02/79.82.14, Prime Ministry decree, Sept. 28, 1937.
23 BCA, 030.18.01.02/118.98.20, Prime Ministry decree, Feb. 10, 1949.
24 BCA, 030.18.01.127.95.11, Prime Ministry decree, Dec. 31, 1951.
25 BCA, 030.18.01.02/95.60.3, Prime Ministry decree, July 10, 1941.
27 BCA, 030.18.01.02/51.3.2, Prime Ministry decree, Jan. 13, 1935.
36 Ibid., p. 27.
37 Ibid., p. 45.
38 Ibid., pp. 144–5.
39 Ibid., pp. 122, 133–5, 141.
40 Ibid., p. 156. This discourse of total denial of anything Armenian was reproduced in Kemalist texts on the districts of Diyarbekir as well. One author wrote that Armenian existence in Ergani “had not had the slightest significance.” Muhtar Korucu, “Ergani nin Zulkif Dag,” in Karacadag, vol. VII, no. 83–86 (December/January 1945–1946).
In modern times, Armenians have often found it difficult to decide whether they should view the Turks (of Turkey) and the Azerbaijanis as two separate ethnic groups—and thus apply two mutually independent policies towards them—or whether they should approach them as only two of the many branches of a single, pan-Turkic entity, pursuing a common, long-term political objective, which would—if successful—end up with the annihilation of Armenians in their historical homeland.

Indeed, almost at the same time that the Armenian Question in the Ottoman Empire was attracting worldwide attention, extensive clashes between Armenians and Azerbaijanis first occurred in Transcaucasia in 1905. Clashes—accompanied, on this occasion, with attempts at ethnic cleansing—resumed with heightened intensity after the collapse of tsarism in 1917. They were suppressed only in 1921, by the Russian-dominated communist regime, which reasserted control over Transcaucasia, forced Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia to join the Soviet Union, and imposed itself as the judge in the territorial disputes that had plagued these nations. The communists eventually endorsed Zangezur as part of Armenia, while allocating Nakhichevan and Mountainous Karabagh to Azerbaijan. This arrangement satisfied neither side. A low-intensity Armenian-Azerbaijani struggle persisted during the next decades within the limits permitted by the Soviet system. Repeated Armenian attempts to detach Mountainous Karabagh from Azerbaijan were its most visible manifestation.

At the time, Turkey was outside of Soviet control and formed part of a rival bloc in the post-World War II international order. The difference in the type of relations Armenia had with Turkey and Azerbaijan during the Soviet era partly dictated the dissimilar ways the memories of genocide and inter-ethnic violence were tackled by Soviet Armenian historians until 1988. Benefiting from Moscow's more permissive attitude from the mid-1950's, Soviet Armenian historians, backed implicitly by the country's communist leadership, openly accused the Turks of genocide, but made no parallels between the circumstances under which Armenians had been killed in the Ottoman Empire or during clashes with Azerbaijanis earlier in the 20th century. Getting Moscow's acquiescence, especially if their works would be published in Moscow and/or in Russian, was

While the continuing struggle between Armenian and Turkish officials and activists for or against the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide of 1915 shows no sign of abating, and while its dynamics are becoming largely predictable, a new actor is increasingly attracting attention for its willingness to join this “game.” It is Azerbaijan, which has—since 1988—been engaged in at times lethal conflict with Armenians over Mountainous Karabagh.

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not easy for Armenians. However, Soviet Armenian historians were, at the same time, “protected” from challenges by Turkish state-supported revisionism (or, as others describe it, negationism), which was suppressed even more firmly within the Soviet Union.

Hence, it is still difficult to know what Soviet Azerbaijani historians thought about the Armenian Genocide of 1915: Were they more sympathetic to arguments produced by Soviet Armenian historians or those who had the blessing of the authorities in Ankara? The polemic between Soviet Armenian and Soviet Azerbaijani historians centered from the mid-1960’s on the legacy of Caucasian Albania. A theory developed in Soviet Azerbaijan assumed that the once Christian Caucasian Albanians were the ancestors of the modern-day Muslim Azerbaijanis. Thereafter, all Christian monuments in Soviet Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan (including all medieval Armenian churches, monasteries and cross-stones, which constituted the vast majority of these monuments) were declared to be Caucasian Albanian and, hence, Azerbaijani. Medieval Armenians were openly accused of forcibly assimilating the Caucasian Albanians and laying claim to their architectural monuments and works of literature. This was probably the closest that Soviet Azerbaijanis came—in print—to formally accusing the Armenians of committing genocide against their (Caucasian Albanian) ancestors.

Since 1988, however, as the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Mountainous Karabagh has gotten bloodier and increasingly intractable, the Azerbaijani positions on both negating the Armenian Genocide of 1915 and accusing Armenians of having themselves committed a genocide against the Azerbaijanis have become more pronounced and now receive full backing from all state institutions, including the country’s last two presidents, Heydar and Ilham Aliyev. Azerbaijani officials, politicians, and wide sections of civil society, including the head of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Caucasus, Sheikh ul-Islam Haji Allahshukur Pashazada, as well as numerous associations in the Azerbaijani diaspora, now fully identify themselves with Turkey’s official position that the Armenian Genocide is simply a lie, intentionally fabricated in pursuit of sinister political goals. Even representatives of the Georgian, Jewish, and Udi ethnic communities in Azerbaijan have joined the effort. Unlike in Turkey, there is not yet a visible minority in Azerbaijan that openly disagrees with their government’s stand on this issue. This probably explains the absence of the Azerbaijani judiciary in the campaign to deny the 1915 genocide. If there are officials or intellectuals who remain unconvinced with this theory propagated by their government, it seems that they still prefer to keep a very low profile.

The Azerbaijani position depicts the same ambiguity as Ankara’s. On the one hand, repeating almost verbatim the arguments in mainstream Turkish historiography, they flatly deny that what happened to Armenians was genocide. At the same time, they frequently contend that this historical issue remains controversial to this day and that these genocide claims need to be further investigated. These two positions can be reconciled only if the outcome of the proposed additional research is pre-determined, whereby the proponents of the genocide explanation would eventually concede that they had been wrong all along. Indeed, Azerbaijanis try to show that Armenians are avoiding such a debate because they fear that they will lose the argument.

Azerbaijanis argue that Armenians want to convince the world that they were subjected to genocide because they plan to take advantage of this to push forward their sinister aims. They warn that, after achieving international recognition of the genocide, Armenians will demand compensation and raise territorial claims against Turkey. Moreover, Azerbaijanis maintain that Armenians, by pursuing the issue of genocide recognition, are seeking to divert international attention from their continuing aggression against Azerbaijan, including the occupation of Mountainous Karabagh. Moreover, any prominence given to the Armenian Genocide claims may—according to Azerbaijanis—also aggravate prejudice and hatred in the South Caucasus, make it difficult to maintain peace, and further delay the just regulation of the Karabagh conflict, which—they argue—is already being hindered because of Armenian intransigence and arrogance. The Azerbaijanis claim that by recognizing the Armenian Genocide, foreign countries will show themselves “to be in cooperation and solidarity with aggressor Armenia.” They will also justify the actions of Armenia, which—for Azerbaijan—is a country that encourages terrorism. They will also become an instrument in the hands of (Armenian) instigators trying to stir up enmity among these countries, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and even the entire Turkic and Islamic world.

In the specific cases of both the United States and France, which are heavily involved in attempts to regulate the Karabagh conflict, recognizing the Armenian Genocide will—argue Azerbaijani sources—cast a shadow on their reputation as bastions of justice and old democratic traditions. It will also weaken their role in the Caucasus and perhaps in the whole world. Reacting to French deliberations to penalize the denial of the Armenian Genocide, Azerbaijanis argued that this would curtail free speech. In Estonia and Georgia, local Azerbaijani organizations have argued that the formal commemoration of the genocide may lead to a conflict between the Armenian and Azerbaijani communities living in those countries. Commenting on the discussion of the Armenian Genocide issue in the French legislature, an Azerbaijani deputy stated that the adoption of that bill might result in all Turks and Azerbaijanis having to leave France. Indeed, some Azerbaijanis have gone so far as to argue that pursuing the genocide recognition campaign is not helpful to Armenia either; such resolutions would further isolate Armenia in the Caucasus, while only leaders of Armenian diaspora organizations would benefit. In fact, those Armenians whose relatives died in 1915 should—according to Azerbaijani analysts—be saddened by such manipulation of their families’ tragedy in exchange for some political gains today.
Nevertheless, Azerbaijanis admit that the current Armenian strategy has had some success in convincing third parties that there was a genocide in 1915. Azerbaijanis attribute this success to a number of factors: the prevailing ignorance in the West regarding the real situation in the Caucasus; the strength of the lobbying efforts of the Armenian diaspora; and the prevailing anti-Turkic and anti-Islamic bias in the "Christian" West.

Because Armenian Genocide resolutions are usually pushed by legislators and opposed by the executive branches of various governments, the Azerbaijanis differ in their explanation of this trend. Some put the blame solely on ignorant, selfish, and short-sighted legislators, while others argue that the executive branch is also involved in these efforts. Vafa Quluzada, a former high-ranking Azerbaijani diplomat and presidential adviser, claimed that George Bush and Condoleezza Rice stood behind the resolution passed by the House International Relations Committee on Oct. 10, 2007. “The Armenian lobby was created by the U.S. administration,” he said. “If otherwise, who would allow the Armenian Assembly to sit in the building of the Congress?” Quluzada claimed that the “Americans established [the Armenian lobby] and support it in order to cover up their expansion in the world.”

Within the context of their campaign against the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide, Azerbaijanis often repeat the official Turkish argument that evaluating the events of 1915 is more a job for historians than politicians. Azerbaijani officials and parliamentarians have publicly objected to the laying of wreaths by foreign dignitaries at the Armenian Genocide Memorial in Yerevan, the possible use of the term “genocide” in the annual U.S. presidential addresses on April 24, and the discussion of this issue in national parliaments or by international organizations. Azerbaijani deputies have established direct contact with foreign parliamentarians to explain their viewpoint. At the same time, Azerbaijani politicians, pundits, and news agencies consistently downplay the political weight of foreign parliamentarians who raise the genocide issue in their respective legislatures.

Moreover, organizations of Azerbaijani civil society have organized pickets and demonstrations in front of the embassies of states in Baku, which were feared to be taking steps towards recognizing the Armenian Genocide. Azerbaijani television stations have also filmed documentaries on location in Turkey recording what they describe as acts of Armenian tyranny in Ottoman times. A Russian television station, which is transmitted regularly in Azerbaijan, was temporarily taken off the air when it showed Atom Egoyan’s film “Ararat.” In October 2006, when the French National Assembly was debating the passage of the bill criminalizing the denial of the Armenian Genocide, Azerbaijan Public Television and a number of private television stations stopped showing films and clips produced in France. Finally, hackers from Azerbaijan continually attack Armenian sites with messages denying the Armenian Genocide.

Azerbaijani expatriates have also been active. On April 24, in both 2002 and 2003, Azerbaijani deputies in the Georgian parliament attempted to block suggestions by their Armenian colleagues to pay homage to the memory of Armenian Genocide victims. Azerbaijani expatriates of lesser standing have, in turn, often held demonstrations, issued statements, held press conferences, and organized books and photograph exhibitions in various countries where they reside. In the United States, the Azeris’ Union of America reported on March 15, 2006 that it had “distributed more than 600 statements and letters denouncing Armenian lies among American congressmen and senators.” Azerbaijanis in America also reportedly earned the gratitude of Douglas Frantz, the managing editor of the Los Angeles Times, by sending hundreds of letters to the newspaper in his support, after he was criticized for preventing the publication of an article on the genocide by Mark Arax.

Among the books distributed by Azerbaijani activists in order to propagate their own views to foreigners are some of the publications that have been printed in Baku since 1990 in Azerbaijani, Russian and English. Some of these works are authored by Azerbaijanis; others are Russian-language translations (and, in one case, a Romanian translation) of works by George de Maleville and Erich Feigl, and of Armenian Allegations: Myth and Reality: A Handbook of Facts and Documents, compiled by the Assembly of Turkish American Associations—all acclaimed by the supporters of the Turkish state-approved thesis regarding the 1915 deportations. In June 2001, Baku State University invited Feigl to Azerbaijan. He was later awarded the Order of Honor by President Ilham Aliyev. In August 2002, Samuel A. Weems, the author of Armenia: Secrets of a Christian Terrorist State, also visited Baku at the invitation of the Sahil Information and Research Center.

Former and serving Turkish diplomats, as well as Turkish and Azerbaijani parliamentarians, have repeatedly called for further cooperation and the development of a common strategy—both at the official and civil society levels—to foil Armenian lobbying efforts. Part of this cooperation is within the realm of Turkish and Azerbaijani academia; conferences dedicated fully to the Armenian

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Palloon (Demirdjian) Aghjayan
BORN: Dikranagerd; February 24, 1912
DIED: Boston, Mass.; June 24, 1938

Malikof Aghjayan
BORN: Burun Kishla, Yozgat; August 15, 1893
DIED: Boston Mass.; March 30, 1974
issue or panels on this topic within the confines of broader academic gatherings—with the participation of Azerbaijani, Turkish, and sometimes other experts—have taken place frequently in Baku, Istanbul, Erzerum, and other locations. Among the longer-term projects, one may point out that the Turkish Historical Society, Baku State University, the Institute of Azerbaijan History, and the Association of Businessmen of Azerbaijan-Turkey established a joint working group on May 15, 2006 to make the international community aware of the Armenian issue. It would meet once every three months, alternating between Baku and Ankara. The following year, the League of Investigating Journalists in Azerbaijan launched a Center for Armenianology, where five specialists, mostly immigrants from Armenia, would work. This center has reportedly established ties with Erzerum University, which already has a center on what it describes as the “alleged Armenian Genocide.”

Turkish-Azerbaijani cooperation against the Armenian Genocide recognition campaign is also evident among the Turkish and Azerbaijani expatriate communities in Europe and the United States. Indeed, some of the demonstrations mentioned above as the activities of the Azerbaijani diaspora were organized in conjunction with local Turkish organizations. Within Turkey, among the Igdir, Kars, and Erzerum residents, who consider themselves victims of an Armenian-perpetrated genocide, and who filed a lawsuit against the novelist Orhan Pamuk in June 2006, were also ethnic Azerbaijanis; their ancestors had moved from territories now part of Armenia.

Azerbaijanis, like Turks, are very interested in having the Jews as allies in their struggle against the Armenian Genocide recognition campaign. Like Turks, Azerbaijanis do not question the Holocaust. However, they liken the Armenians to its perpetrators—the Nazis—and not its victims—the Jews—as is the case among Holocaust and genocide scholars. The Azerbaijanis argue that Jews should join their efforts to foil Armenian attempts at genocide recognition because there was also a genocide perpetrated by Jews in Azerbaijan, at the time of the genocide against Azerbaijanis in the early 20th century. They repeatedly state that several thousand Jews died then because of Armenian cruelty. The support of Jewish residents of Ujun (Germany) to public events organized by the local Azerbaijanis was attributed to their being provided with documents that listed 87 Jews murdered by Armenians in Guba (Azerbaijan) in 1918.7

Yevda Abramov, currently the only Jewish member of the Azerbaijani parliament, is prominent in pushing for such joint Azerbaijani-Jewish efforts. He consistently seeks to show to his ethnic Azerbaijani compatriots that Israel and Jews worldwide share their viewpoint regarding the Armenian Genocide claims. In August 2007, he commented that “one or two Jews can recognize [the] Armenian genocide. That will be the result of Armenian lobby’s impact. However, that does not mean that Jews residing in the United States and the organizations functioning there also recognize the genocide.” He explained that because expenditures for election to the U.S. Congress are high, some Jewish candidates receive contributions from the Armenian lobby and, in return, have to meet the interests of this lobby. According to Abramov, “except [for the] Holocaust, Jews do not recognize any [other] event as genocide.”

Azerbaijani arguments that Armenians perpetrated a genocide against Azerbaijanis and Jews in the early 20th century have received little attention outside Azerbaijani circles. However, when the issue was touched upon in a contribution to the Jerusalem Post by Lenny Ben-David, a former Israeli adviser to the Turkish Embassy in Washington, D.C. on Sept. 4, 2007, his article was also quickly distributed by the Azeri Press Agency. Ben-David called on Israel and Jewish-Americans to be careful regarding Armenian claims against Turkey. He listed a number of instances when—he believed—Armenians had massacred hundreds of thousands of Turkish Muslims and thousands of Jews. “Recently, Mountain Jews in Azerbaijan requested assistance in building a monument to 3,000 Azeri Jews killed by Armenians in 1918 in a pogrom about which little is known,” he wrote.8

Even if the official Turkish and Azerbaijani positions are in total agreement regarding the denial of the Armenian Genocide, some tactical differences can be discerned when analyzing Azerbaijani news reports in recent years. For example, Azerbaijani calls to impose sanctions against states whose legislatures have recognized the Armenian Genocide have never gone beyond the rhetoric. In 2001, they were openly condemned by President Heydar Aliyev. On a few other occasions, suspicions, not to say fears, can also be noticed, when one of the two parties becomes anxious that the other partner may desert the common cause and appease the Armenian side at its own expense.

Most of these Azerbaijani efforts to correct what they perceive as purposefully distorted history are directed toward audiences in third countries, not in Armenia. For Armenians, on the other hand, the chief opponents in their quest for the international recognition of the Armenian Genocide remain the Turkish state and those segments of Turkish society, evidently the majority, which have internalized the official viewpoint. For most Armenians, the support this standpoint is increasingly receiving from Azerbaijan is still at most a sideshow. They still seem unaware of the growing

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Giragos DerManuelian
Born: Sakrat, Palu; 1907
Died: Providence, R.I.; November 22, 1985

Vahan Dadayan
Born: Dikranagerd; September 15, 1915
Died: New Jersey; October 13, 2001
Azerbaijani engagement in this issue. The “war of words” between Armenian and Azerbaijani officials remain largely confined to mutual accusations of destroying historical monuments. On certain occasions, one side or the other dubs the mixture of acts of neglect and vandalism by the other as “Cultural Genocide,” while at the same time denying that their own side has any case to answer. However, mutual accusations of the destruction of monuments are just the tip of the iceberg in a larger interpretation of demographic processes in Transcaucasia in the last 200 years as one, continual process of ethnic cleansing. Within this context, the term “genocide” is often used as shorthand to indicate slow, but continuing ethnic cleansing, punctuated with moments of heightened violence also serving the same purpose. Indeed, where the contemporary Azerbaijani attitude toward Armenia departs from Turkey’s is now the official standpoint in Baku that the Armenians have pursued a policy of genocide against the Azerbaijanis during the past two centuries.

While the Turkish state and dominant Turkish elites vehemently object to the use of the term “genocide” to describe the Armenian deportations of 1915, and while some Turkish historians, politicians, and a few municipal authorities have accused the Armenians themselves of having committed genocide against the Ottoman Muslims/Turks—in their replies to what they say are Armenian “allegations”—this line of accusation has never been officially adopted, to date at least, by the highest authorities. It has not become a part of state-sponsored lobbying in foreign countries.

However, Azerbaijani efforts have taken a different direction over the past few years. Azerbaijani officials—even those of the highest rank—now assert repeatedly that Armenians have committed “the real genocide,” resulting in the death or deportation of up to two million Azerbaijanis in the last 200 years. Armenians, they say, invaded Azerbaijan’s historical lands, ousted its population, created an Armenian state, and falsified history through the destruction or “Armenianization” of historical Azerbaijani monuments and changing geographical names. Azerbaijan has even made a few timid, and so far unsuccessful, attempts to have the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) approve a document adopting this viewpoint. In March 2007, Isosif Shagal, the head of the Israel-Azerbaijan inter-parliamentary association, acknowledged that the Knesset had received documents about the genocide committed against Azerbaijanis.

In 1998, President Heydar Aliyev decreed March 31 as Genocide Day—an annual day of national mourning in Azerbaijan. It marks all episodes of genocide against Azerbaijanis by Armenians since the turn of the 20th century. Four specific timeframes were highlighted as periods of intense Armenian persecution and massacres. The first was 1905-07, when Azerbaijanis say that tens of thousands of civilians were killed in Yerevan, Vedibasar, Zangezur, and Karabagh, while hundreds of settlements were razed to the ground. Then, following the Communist Revolution in 1917, the Azerbaijani people reportedly faced a new series of calamities over a period of a year and a half. Tens of thousands were killed by Armenians—with communist support—in Baku beginning on March 31, 1918. (This is the symbolic date chosen to commemorate all acts of violence against the Azerbaijanis.) Azerbaijanis see a third major episode of this Armenian policy of genocide in what they describe as the mass deportation of thousands of Azerbaijanis from Soviet Armenia from 1948-53. Finally, the last intensive stage of Armenian persecution coincides with the most recent phase of the Karabagh conflict, which began in 1988.

Since 1998, a series of annual rituals has been developed in Azerbaijan to mark the Genocide Day, including a special address by the Azerbaijani president, the lowering of national flags all over the country, and a procession by officials, diplomats, and scores of ordinary citizens to Baku’s Alley of Martyrs. Ceremonies are also held in other parts of the country, along with classes dedicated to the Genocide Day in educational institutions and exhibitions. Memorials have already been erected in Guba, Nakhichevan, Shamakha, and Lankaran. Relevant events are also organized in Azerbaijani embassies abroad.

Outside the confines of Azerbaijani state structures, Sheikh ul-Islam Pashazada also appealed to the world in 2002 to recognize the events of March 31, 1918 as genocide. Azerbaijani scholars and politicians have propagated this new thesis during conferences in Turkey. On April 24, 2003, a group of writers and journalists set up an organization called “31 March” to compensate for what they thought were the feeble activities of the state structures and public organizations in this sphere. Action in this regard is also gradually spreading to the Azerbaijani diaspora and involving Turkish expatriates living in Europe.

Among all instances of mass murder specified in the Azerbaijani presidential decree on genocide, the massacre in the village of Khojaly in Mountainous Karabagh on Feb. 26, 1992 is given the most prominence. Its anniversary is now observed annually with rallies and speeches—in addition to the annual Genocide Day on March 31. In 1994, four years before the formal adoption of the Genocide Day, the Azerbaijani National Assembly had already recognized the events in Khojaly as genocide and requested parliaments throughout the world to recognize it as such. Similar requests have been repeated since, both by the country’s successive presidents and other public figures. The massacre/genocide of Khojaly also comes up regularly—and in its own right—in joint academic and educational activities by Turkish and Azerbaijani scholars.

These Azerbaijani arguments that they continue to be the target of a genocidal campaign by Armenians is going hand in hand these days with the historical thesis that Armenians are newcomers to the territories they are now living on, and that they have taken control of these territories through a premeditated campaign of genocide and ethnic cleansing. The origins of this modern Azerbaijani interpretation of Armenian history go back at least to the territorial claims that the Azerbaijanis presented at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. It also manifested itself in part during the above-mentioned “paper wars” between Soviet Armenian and Azerbaijani historians from the mid-1960’s. Modern-day Azerbaijanis put the beginning of their
These countries and their respective educational systems. A genuine genocide was committed in Khojaly: The Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Caucasus hailed the present position of the US Congress," Yeri Musavat, Baku, Oct. 23, 2000.


8 I. Alizadeh, "Jews Recognize no Event as Genocide except Holocaust," Trend, Aug. 24, 2007. This statement by Abramov that Jews recognize only the Holocaust as a genocide contradicts his use of phrases like “the genocide of Azerbaijani Jews perpetrated by the Armenians” or his reference that the massacres at Khojaly in 1992 constituted genocide.


This study also indicates that the increasingly politicized use of the term “genocide” among Armenians, Turks, and Azerbaijani is leading (perhaps unconsciously) to the trivialization of this concept, whereby its relatively strict definition provided for in the 1948 United Nations Convention is being replaced by a looser meaning. The word “genocide” often becomes, in the context described in this article, a synonym for “ethnic cleansing” or even smaller-scale and ethnically motivated massacre or murder. The frequent use of the term “genocide” by Armenians to describe the pogrom in Sumgait (Azerbaijan) in February 1988 is also indicative of this trend. While it is beyond doubt that the murder of individuals, massacres, and acts of ethnic cleansing deserve punishment as criminal offences no less than a crime of genocide, maintaining a healthy respect towards the distinctions, which scholarship has devised over decades to define the various types of mass slaughter, appears to be necessary more than ever in order to have a more accurate understanding of the peculiarities of various episodes in history and similar occurrences in the world today.

Finally, the enthusiasm shown by Azerbaijan in denying the Armenian Genocide (when modern-day Armenians do not usually hold it responsible for committing the crime) brings to attention the fact that denial is not necessarily only “the last phase of genocide”; genocide can also be denied by groups other than the perpetrators and/or their biological or ideological heirs. Genocide can be denied by the new foes of the (old) victims, and again the Armenian case is not unique and can become the topic of yet another comparative study.

ENDNOTES

1 This article is an abridged version of the paper “My Genocide, Not Yours: The Introduction of the ‘Genocide’ Paradigm to the Armeno-Azerbaijani ‘War of Words,’” which the author presented at the Sixth Workshop on Armenian Turkish Scholarship in Geneva on March 1, 2008.

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Among the great atrocities of the modern era, the Armenian Genocide comes quickly to mind. It was not, historically, the first genocide of the 20th century, as is often stated. That unfortunate distinction belongs to the Herero and Nama of German Southwest Africa (present-day Namibia), against whom the German army carried out a clear campaign of annihilation between 1904 and 1908. Probably 60–80 percent of the Herero and 40–60 percent of the Nama died after they revolted against German colonial role. They died as a result of direct killings by the German army and German settlers; by being deliberately forced into the Omaheke Desert, where German officers knew they would die of thirst and starvation; and by the horrendous conditions in concentration camps, where the mortality rate was 45 percent according to official military statistics (and probably in fact higher).

Even more than the tragic fate of the Herero and Nama, the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust share many characteristics. They were not, to be sure, identical—no historical events ever are. But by looking at them comparatively, we can see some common features that may also help us identify warning signs for the future.

Some powerful voices exist in the scholarly and public realms that continue to argue that no event in history is comparable to the Nazi drive to annihilate Jews. But “uniqueness” is, at best, a theological argument, not a position subject to normal scholarly and political debate. Or it is a mundane point—all events are historically unique in the sense that they occur in a particular time and place and are not replicable.

Instead, the thrust of recent research and writing lies clearly in the comparative direction. Every reputable historian, political scientist, or sociologist recognizes the enormous atrocity that the Nazis committed against Jews. The result was the greatest tragedy in Jewish history; moreover, the complacency about Western moral and cultural superiority shattered amid the revelations that the drive to annihilate an entire population had occurred in the very heart of Europe was a product of Western civilization itself.

The Nazi genocide of the Jews had its particular features, to be sure, and they had everything to do with Germany’s highly developed bureaucratic and military culture, which enabled the Nazis, once they had seized the organs of the state, to implement policies in a highly systematic manner. The other important particularity was Germany’s great power status, which contributed to huge territorial ambitions in Europe, much grander than most other genocidal regimes of the 20th century. But “particular” is not quite the same thing as “unique.”

In both the late Ottoman Empire under the Young Turks and in Nazi Germany, Armenians and Jews were categorized as the consummate “other.” In both societies, long-standing prejudices, based on traditional religious differences, had existed for centuries. Yet Armenians were also known as the “most loyal millet” and Jewish life had indeed flourished in Germany. But around the turn into the 20th century, the prejudices against both groups hardened and
turned uglier. For everyone adversely affected by the modern world, by the surge in commercial activity, education, social advancement, and mobility, Armenians and Jews became the target because both groups had, in fact, contributed to and benefited from these changes. At least some Armenians and some Jews became more prosperous over the course of the 19th century and moved easily among well-off and educated counterparts in France, Britain, and the Netherlands, even while most Armenians and Jews maintained more traditional and sometimes impoverished lives in eastern Anatolia and eastern Europe. The obvious well-being of some Armenians and Jews, their commercial, professional, and educational success in urban centers like Istanbul and Berlin, made them easy targets for those who resented their prosperity and social status.

German officials, businessmen, and intellectuals who were active in the Ottoman Empire sometimes contributed to the escalating prejudices against Armenians. Some defined Armenians and Turks in racial terms, despite the absurdity, at least by today’s standards, of turning ethnic or religious groups into races. Academics like Ernst Jackh strongly supported close ties between Germany and the Ottoman Empire, whether it was governed by the sultan or the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). They viewed the Turks in racial terms as the Prussians of the East, a disciplined, militaristic people that could successfully impose its ways on lesser populations. Among those lesser groups were the Armenians and Greeks, about whom many German officials had decidedly mixed attitudes, at best. For some Germans, Armenians were the brotherly Christians who suffered under Muslim Turkish oppression. But for many Germans committed to the relationship with Turkey, the Armenians were a troublesome group and worse. Their nationalist strivings threatened the integrity of the empire, and their commercial occupations made them the Jews of the Orient, not exactly a positive attribute in German eyes. The German archives are full of negative references to Greeks and Armenians, who are often characterized as even more adept merchants and money lenders than Jews. Baron Marschall von Biberstein, who served as German ambassador in Istanbul from the mid-1890’s to 1913, commented that “all Orientals are involved in intrigues. The Armenians and Greeks are masters of the trade.” As a result, there was little place for anti-Semitism in Turkey. “The economic activity, which elsewhere the Jews perform, namely the exploitation of the poorer, popular classes through usury and similar manipulations, is here performed exclusively by Armenians and Greeks. The Spanish Jews who settled here cannot make any headway against them.” German textile manufacturers and German efforts to control transport represented serious competition to some Armenians and Greeks, both of whom, according to one German company, instituted all sorts of intrigues against German interests.

Lurking behind such sentiments was also the notion that Armenians were “a problem” because Germany prized, above all else, stability so that it could exercise predominant influence in the Ottoman Empire. That meant support for an iron-fisted state, even when it committed atrocities. As a result, official Germans were willing to countenance the Young Turk deportations and massacres of Armenians.

At home, many Germans began to see Jews as a problem. Their success in German society became a source of resentment, and by...
the turn into the 20th century, conservative-minded people in all the major institutions—business, academia, Catholic and Protestant churches, officer corps, state bureaucracy—claimed that Jewish influence had become too great, even though Jews represented only three-quarters of one percent of the population. After World War I and the Russian Revolution, Adolf Hitler

proved uniquely adept at propagating the myth of “Judaic Bolshevism,” an identification of Jews with communism and the Soviet Union even while he railed against supposed Jewish domination of the financial markets. In Nazi eyes, Jews constituted an existential threat to German life, and the attack on the Soviet Union was designed to eliminate that threat once and for all. As the historian Saul Friedlander has written, the Nazis adopted a “redemptive anti-Semitism,” the belief that German life could flourish only through the destruction of Jews.

But the move from prejudice, discrimination, and persecution to genocide is a huge step. It does not happen naturally or inevitably. Many governments and societies discriminate against but do not kill populations in their midst. For both the late Ottoman Empire under the Young Turks and Germany under the Nazis, war provided all the essential conditions that led them to escalate their hostilities against, respectively, Armenians and Jews to mass killings. In wartime, both states could impose emergency conditions that gave officials the freedom to act in ways they would not dare venture in peacetime. The upheavals of war also heightened the sense of insecurity, leading to calls for swift and forceful actions to remove those who were seen as dangers to the national cause or to the creation of the new society. At the same time, wars opened up vistas of pleasure in the future and presented great opportunities for vast restructurings of societies and populations. Wars by definition are also violent acts; they create cultures of violence and killing.

For the Young Turks, World War I followed quickly on the humiliating defeats of the Balkan Wars and the loss of so much Ottoman territory and population. Their German ally promised them the restoration (and more) of their losses, but the Young Turks began thinking in even more grandiose terms, of extending the territory into Central Asia, of reconstructing the empire internally to guarantee the unquestioned predominance of Turks. Armenians sat in the middle of this grand vision, their ancestral settlement in eastern Anatolia threatening (in Young Turk eyes) a contiguous empire through the Caucasus and beyond. The Nazis also had grandiose ambitions, a German imperium from the Atlantic to the Urals and beyond. The Jews (in Nazi eyes) were the great threat to this vision, their lack of a state, their diasporic presence all over the continent a sign of the grave danger they presented to the Nazi vision.

The fortunes of war decisively shaped the timing and implementation of the genocides. In both instances, among both Young Turks and Nazis, we can see at work the “euphoria of victory” and the fear of defeat. The disastrous defeat of Ottoman forces by the Armenians at Sarikamesh early in 1915 inspired a crisis atmosphere among the Ottoman elite, which was only heightened by the British and Commonwealth approach to Istanbul at the Dardanelles. But there, the Ottoman army held off the most powerful navy in the world, touching off a sense of euphoria. It is no accident that the CUP launched the genocide of the Armenians at precisely this moment marked by both great insecurity and euphoria. Now the Young Turks felt they could and should eliminate the Armenian population they viewed as the greatest internal threat and take a major step toward creating the new empire they envisaged.

The Nazis launched the Holocaust at a similar moment. Within weeks of the invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, German officers were talking about the war lasting just 14 or 21 more days—to us today an astounding, barely comprehensible miscalculation. But the German army was used to the rapid movement of its forces and quick victory. In this context, some Nazis, like the head of the SS, Heinrich Himmler, intensified the killing of Jews that had already begun with the entry of German forces into the Soviet Union. For Himmler and others, eliminating Jews was the expression of their euphoria and the belief that now, finally, the Nazis could accomplish what they really wanted to do, kill Jews. But by late August the invasion was slowing down and in October the Soviets held off the Germans before Moscow. Other Nazis, including, most probably, Hitler, now turned on the Jews in fury. Hitler sought to make good on his comments to the Reichstag in January 1939, when he proclaimed, in a bone-chilling fantasy, that if the Jews should start another world war, the result would be not the defeat of Germany but the destruction of the Jews. As in the Ottoman Empire in 1915, the euphoria of victory and the dread fear of defeat ran together, leading each regime to opt for the mass displacement and killing of the population it had defined as its greatest threat.

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Anush Meneshian
BORN: Sepastia, Sepastia; 1895
DIED: Jerusalem; 1945

Aristakes Meneshian
BORN: Govdoon, Sepastia; 1888
DIED: Chicago, Ill.; 1981
events, like virtually every other genocide in the 20th century, also involved mass participation. The literal reshaping of the population, the systematic violence against Armenians and Jews, could not simply be decreed and could not happen over night. It had to be created by the hard work of thousands and thousands of people, those who actually carried out, by gunpoint, the deportations; kept trains moving (of Armenian as well as Jewish deportees); guarded victims in makeshift gathering points or concentration camps; pulled the triggers, raised the swords, or threw in the gas; and moved into the farms, homes, and apartments, seized the furnishings and the businesses, of those who were eliminated. In this way, the larger society became complicit in the act of genocide, and that is why in both instances, the post-genocidal society remains haunted by the past.

But herein lies one of the very great differences between these events. After World War II, Germany assumed legal, moral, and economic obligations to the Jewish survivors of the Holocaust, and now, finally, to other victims of Nazi crimes. None of this happened easily or without resentment. The payments to survivors were always insufficient and, ultimately, nothing could really recompense Jews for the loss of loved ones. But starting with the 1952 reparations agreement between Germany and Israel, Germany has assumed its obligations. With extensive school curricula about the Nazi period and the Holocaust, memorials, monuments, and museums all over the country and dictatorial regime can ever win complete compliance of its population. Some people, however few in number, will find their moral core and protest or protect their endangered neighbors, at great risk to themselves. We know that there were such Germans, Poles, and others in occupied Europe. And now, from the research of Taner Akcam, Richard Hovannisian, and others, we also know that there were such Turks who tried to protect Armenians. Those are the people from whom we take sustenance, upon whom we can envisage a more humane future despite the enormous tragedies that befell both Armenians and Jews.

Armin Wegner and Raphael Lemkin were two such individuals. The Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust are linked through their biographies. Wegner was a medic in the German army during World War I, posted to the Ottoman Empire. He was outraged at the atrocities committed against Armenians. The photographic record we have of the Armenian Genocide is to a very great extent a result of the pictures he secretly shot and smuggled out of Anatolia and the Middle East. Twenty years later, he protested, in a letter to Adolf Hitler no less, the rapidly escalating persecution of Jews, an act for which he was interned for a time in a concentration camp. Raphael Lemkin, a Polish Jew, coined the word “genocide.” As a young man he had been deeply affected by the atrocities committed against Armenians. He was in Germany as a law student in 1921 when Soghomon Tehlirian assassinated Talat Pasha, the main architect of the Armenian Genocide. Tehlirian was put on trial but acquitted by a German court. Through these events, Lemkin sought to learn more about what had happened to Armenians and began his intellectual and political quest that culminated, in 1944, in his invention of the word “genocide” and, in 1948, in the adoption by the United Nations of the “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.” Lemkin’s valiant project was driven by his deep revulsion against the atrocities committed against both Armenians and Jews. Although he had suffered very personally from the Holocaust—he learned after the war that 49 members of his family had been killed by the Nazis—his humanitarian sensibility extended far beyond the tragic fate of his own people and included, especially, Armenians as well. And he hoped that by inventing and defining a new word, he could better convey the enormity of the crimes and, hopefully, forestall their repetition against other peoples.

The humanitarianism of Wegner and Lemkin and the many individuals, their names often unknown to us, who tried to protect Armenians or Jews show us another way that the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust are linked events—and enable us to have hope for the future despite the tragedies of the past.

Germany has become a model for how a country comes to terms with and moves beyond the commission of atrocities in the name of its people. In stark contrast, the present-day Turkish state is a model for denying the past and refusing to recognize any of the injustices perpetrated by its predecessor.

not just in Berlin, Germany has become a model for how a country comes to terms with and moves beyond the commission of atrocities in the name of its people. In stark contrast, the present-day Turkish state is a model for denying the past and refusing to recognize any of the injustices perpetrated by its predecessor.

Finally, the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust are linked by one other feature, one that gives us hope for the future: by the humanitarianism of Wegner and Lemkin and the many individuals, their names often unknown to us, who tried to protect Armenians or Jews show us another way that the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust are linked events—and enable us to have hope for the future despite the tragedies of the past. □
In the summer of 2004, I visited the village Kursunlu near Diyarbekir (Amed/Dikranagerd) as part of my field research on the internal displacement of Kurds in Turkey. This village had been forcibly evacuated in 1993 by Turkish security forces upon the refusal of its inhabitants to become village guards. Since the most recent example of demographic engineering through forced displacement in this region has not received much attention neither inside nor outside of Turkey, allow me to summarize briefly.

From 1990–98, the rural areas in southeast Turkey were systematically depopulated and large parts were destroyed during armed clashes between the PKK and the Turkish military. As part of the Turkish military strategy of “low-intensity conflict,” a system of village guards had been introduced in 1985 that offered weapons and a salary to Kurdish villagers to join the military in fighting the PKK. The idea of creating a local militia to pit the population against each other was certainly not new to the region: About a century ago, members of Sunni Kurdish tribes were recruited into the Hamidiye Light Cavalry, which became a major force employed to terrorize and massacre the non-Muslim population. This time, however, the creation of the village guard system proved to be more difficult than the Hamidiye, since it was set up against a Kurdish organization that was rapidly increasing its base among the Kurdish population. The PKK denounced as traitors those villages that accepted the weapons
of the state, and carried out violent attacks against those villages. The military, on the other hand, regarded the villages refusing to set up village guards as traitors to the state and raided them in order to “empty” them. Hamlets at strategic locations in remote rural areas were also evacuated and destroyed to cut off logistic support for the PKK. It is estimated that out of 5,000 villages and hamlets, over 3,400 were evacuated and at least one million Kurdish villagers were displaced. Accounts from the displaced say that the implementation of the displacement was often carried out with brutality and violence. It deprived the displaced Kurds not only of their homes but of their way of life, along with their sources of income. Today, the majority of the displaced villagers live impoverished and marginalized in urban centers in the southeast or in shantytowns of western metropolises in Turkey, disregarded by the state and the general public.

For more than a decade, the Turkish state denied the existence of a strategy of forced displacement, and conceded merely to the existence of 378,000 “migrants” whose villages were “evacuated for security reasons.” Since the lifting of the emergency rule in 2002 (which had been in place since 1987 in 13 overwhelmingly Kurdish-populated provinces), displaced villagers have petitioned the state to return to their villages. Officially, the government now allows the return of displaced Kurds, yet its unwillingness to clear the landmines in the region, its expansion (not abandonment) of the village guards system, and its effort to redesign the region according to state security considerations poses major obstacles for the return of the displaced villagers. The prospects for reconstruction and resettlement are even further dimmed by the heightened tension in the region due to the recent military incursions into northern Iraq and the resurgence of the armed clashes between the PKK and the Turkish army since 2006. In the absence of a political solution to the Kurdish conflict and a political will to confront state crimes of the past and present, state practices such as displacement can always resurge.

Allow me to go back to my visit at the Kursunlu village in 2004. Several petitions from the villagers to return had been declined by the gendarmerie for security reasons. However, the Diyarbakir branch of the Human Rights Association (IHD) knew that a few elderly Kurds had returned to the village for the summer despite the prohibition, living in tents and little huts surrounded by landmines that were still around the village. Together with a colleague, we joined a small delegation of the IHD making our way up to the village, anxious not to step on any mines. Once a prosperous village with over 150 families, what we encountered resembled more a skeleton of the former village: some remainders of walls of houses, wild growing plants and trees with the rusted metal of farm equipments lying around. The only intact building was the mosque, where the imam of the village welcomed us. He and a few old men and women insisted on living in this ghost village mainly for three reasons: to look after their fields, to be close to the graves of their relatives, and to spend their remaining days in the village where they were born. In this eerie setting of a destroyed habitat, where it was not difficult to imagine how lively it might have looked before the displacement strategy, I was overwhelmed and humbled by the painful experiences of these old people sitting in dignity among ruins and

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–Kurdish Dialogue¹
landmines, just to be near their memories and graveyards. I did not ask some questions that went beyond the visible destruction of the village. For instance, I could have asked the imam when the mosque was actually built, since it looked rather new. I could have asked about the fields that he has been tilling all his life and which had been unlawfully taken away from him by village guards after his displacement. I could have asked who they had belonged to before becoming his. When one of the elders mentioned that the Kurdish name of Kursunlu is “Pirejman,” I could have asked if it also had an Armenian name, or, more directly, if he knew where Armenians used to live before they were killed and deported almost a hundred years ago. I could have asked if there were any Armenian villages nearby that are today known as Kurdish villages. But how much room is there for a ferociously suppressed history when the knowledge of the presence was already so suppressed, divided, and contentious?

In that very moment in Kursunlu, my main concern was to understand the scope of the destruction that happened a decade ago, since this was as obscured to the public as was the Armenian Genocide. The majority of the population in Turkey even now is completely ignorant and unaware of the destruction and violence that the region experienced in the course of the displacement process. Apart from the activities of a few human rights organizations and individuals, the majority of scholars and intellectuals from Turkey remained silent during the 1990-98 period, when the massive displacement happened. What separates Kurds in Turkey today from the majority of the population is no longer just a difference in language and culture, but the very difference in collective memory based on the knowledge and experiences such as that of the displacement. Yet, experiences that put a deep rift on one level can open paths for reconciliation on another, if the opportunity is taken. There is a strong case to be made if one takes the relationship between Armenians and Kurds. Before elaborating further, let me go back to the Kursunlu village, to an encounter that struck me the most. One elderly woman, who appeared much more aged than her 63 years, was sitting silently under an almond tree. She had returned to the village because of her son, who was buried in the village cemetery. In 1993, he was shot dead by security forces when the military raided the village. Soon after, her family and the entire village had to leave, taking only a few items with them. She moved with her nine children and many grandchildren first to Diyarbekir, where living costs were too expensive, then to Ergani (Argheny), and then came back by herself to her village. In the meantime, the case of the murder of her son made it to the European Court of Human Rights. The Turkish government had offered the family 17,000 pounds for a friendly settlement to close the case. Despite the three teeth remaining in her mouth, despite her children and grandchildren living in dire poverty, and with no prospects for an improvement of their living conditions in sight, she declined the government’s financial offer for a friendly settlement. “I want this state to apologize for killing my son. My son was a shepherd; they took him away and gave me his dead body. I want them to apologize for what they took away from me. I want justice before I die.” Who else could better relate to this desire for justice than readers of the Armenian Weekly? Who else could better understand the sorrow and desire for justice than Armenians, who survived the genocide or grew up with the memories of it? And who else should better understand Armenian demands for justice and recognition than these displaced Kurds? As I stated in the beginning, I did not raise this issue in Kursunlu. But over the past few years, I have followed the discussions among Kurdish activists and intellectuals on the Kurdish responsibility and the need for a proactive Kurdish confrontation about their roles before, during, and after the Armenian Genocide.

Clearly, this is not an easy topic, yet some positive steps can already be noted. A growing number of Kurdish intellectuals, activists, and politicians have publicly either apologized for or acknowledged Kurdish participation in the genocide. Kurdish intellectuals (such as Eren Keskin, Naci Kutlay, Canip Yildirim, Amir Hassanpour, and Recep Marasli) have addressed the differ-
ent aspects of the genocide, and pushed for further debates. There is even an entry on Wikipedia on “Kurdish recognition of the Armenian Genocide” which lists declarations of numerous Kurdish organizations. Furthermore, Kurdish media outlets have become a valuable site in articulating views and providing information in relation to the genocide. Lastly, personal knowledge and orally transmitted memories of Kurdish involvement in the Armenian Genocide or questions on the Kurdish-Armenian relationship are no longer restricted to “internal debates” among different Kurdish communities, but are increasingly voiced publicly.

While these and other steps are good beginnings, they are certainly far from being sufficient. This insufficiency notwithstanding, however, they carry a promising potential for reconciliation if expanded to a systematic engagement that confronts the issue in an open dialogue with Armenians. Unlike the Armenian-Turkish dialogue, which—as so forcefully analyzed by Henry Theriault and David Davidian in last year’s special April 24 insert of the Armenian Weekly—suffers from an unequal power relationship that has not only effectively curtailed the scope of discussion but also traversed “dialogue” to a synonym for domination, an Armenian-Kurdish dialogue carries the potential for an empowering alliance. It is exactly because of this potential for empowering alliance that the isolation and compartmentalization of the “Armenian Question,” the “Kurdish Question,” and other questions in Turkish politics and intellectual debates exists in the first place. This compartmentalization is certainly not accidental and can be seen as a continuation of divide and rule, benefitting what Theriault called the “imperial domination” of Turkish scholars in the intellectual discourse.

Unfortunately, so far both Armenian and Kurdish intellectuals have reinforced this compartmentalization by not seeking an intensified dialogue with each other. The nationalist demagogy in Turkish politics—that seeks to prove that Abdullah Ocalan is a traitor by ascribing Armenian ancestry to him—certainly had a negative effect on both communities. Some may fear that such an empowering alliance could be portrayed by Turkish nationalists as a union of the enemies of Turkey to demand land, compensation, etc. It’s time to leave such fears behind. A mind-set that investigates the ethnic-religious affiliation of a person to disprove his or her integrity is a racist one. And a dialogue that does not allow one to even think about issues of land and compensation is dishonest, at best. Taking the current borders of the Turkish nation-state as the ultimate (and indisputable) reference point while criticizing the nationalist foundations of Turkey is not a post-nationalist but rather a soft-nationalist stance. For a genuine dialogue, we need to contest these discursive limitations instead of trying to appease and navigate within them. I believe that an Armenian-Kurdish engagement has the potential to supersede such limitations and engage in such genuine dialogue. Let me explain why.

After the transition from empire to republic, the Kurds experienced a transition themselves from “perpetrator” to “victim,” to put it in crude terms. Having displaced and dispossessed the non-Muslim population in east Anatolia, the Kurds soon became subject to massive state violence themselves in the early years of the republic. Their resistance to the Turkification policies rendered them hostile elements to the nation-state that was still in the making. After an excessive use of violence (including bombs and air raids) that reached its peak in the Dersim massacres of 1937–38 and resulted in the deaths and massive displacement of tens of thousands, the very existence of the Kurds was categorically denied. Yet despite the denial, the use of force, and a massive ideological apparatus, the efforts of the Turkish state to assimilate the Kurdish population were only partially successful. With the emergence of the PKK, a large Kurdish mobilization was initiated that challenged the state’s denial politics by demanding acknowledgement. Today, the term “Mountain Turk” may appear as a description from the Stone Age for the younger generation, but the losses, sufferings, and damages accompanying the Kurdish struggle for recognition are still fresh in the memories of many Kurds, and get revived with ongoing discrimination and violence. In relation with these experiences, one demand frequently articulated among Kurdish politicians in recent years is to establish a truth commission for the investigation of human rights violations during the internal war from 1984–99. Clearly, such demands will get a much different force and credibility if Kurds themselves enter a process to engage in truth-seeking regarding their own role in the Armenian Genocide. As stated before, the increasing articulation of Kurds regarding their participation in the genocide is a good step in the right direction. Yet there are some important inconsistencies at stake when other political demands are articulated.

For instance, some leading Kurdish politicians such as Ahmet Turk—who in a recent visit to Germany apologized for the participation of Kurds in the genocide—like to point out that the Turkish Republic was founded by Turks and Kurds together and therefore demand a revision of the Turkish constitution that acknowledges Kurds as founding elements of the nation-state. While the intention of this political demand is to challenge the nationalist emphasis of the Turkish Republic, it inadvertently—and quite haplessly—confirms the Kurdish complicity in the horrific crime that laid the grounds for a religiously more or less homogenous nation-state. In light of the pressure of the Turkish media, intellectuals, and military, the current trend in Kurdish politics is to prove their commitment to the current borders of the Turkish state and their loyalty to the sovereignty of the Turkish Republic. While this is not surprising given the unilateral conditionality that only Kurds and Armenians are exposed to (that they have no territorial claims, that they want to live in peaceful co-existence, that they disavow the PKK, ASALA, or any use of violence), and while Turkish politicians and scholars never have to pass this test for proper liberal

Agop Gigiyan
Born: Gigi, Kayseri; 1918
Died: Boston, Mass.; 2002

Maryam Yildiz Gigiyan
Born: Gigi, Kayseri; 1920
Died: Boston, Mass.; 2002
As scholars of displacement know, the answer to the question “When does displacement end?” has not yet been determined.13

ENDNOTES
1 I would like to express my deep gratitude to Banu Karaca and Seyhan Bayraktar for their valuable comments and insights.
2 This was part of a research project I carried out with Deniz Yuksel.
4 For a brief overview, see Robert Olson (1989) and Martin van Bruinessen (1992).
7 A discussion of what the multiple roles of Kurds were exceeds the scope of this paper. Yet, there has not been sufficient research carried out on this issue. The Kurds themselves are not a monolithic community, and religious, and political differences have resulted in complex relationships. For instance, research on Armenians and Alevi Kurds in Dersim points out the respectful coexistence of both communities and their refusal to join the massacres of the Armenians (see Hayreni, Hovsep (1969), Ermeni Kirimlari ve Dersim, Bursa, 1973).
9 Two recent examples: The latest documentary, "Close-up Kurdistan," by Kurdish director Yuksel Yavuz contains a brief segment on the Armenian Genocide; witness accounts of the genocide by Kurds, printed in the Armenian Weekly, March 29 and April 5, 2008.
10 Henry Theriault, "Post-Genocide Imperial Domination," The Armenian Weekly, April 24, 2007
11 See e.g. the article "Sevr travması ve Kürtilerin empatisi" by Kurdish MP Aysel Tugluk in the Turkish daily Radikal, May 27, 2007.
13 See e.g. Special Issue on this topic in the Forced Migration Review, May 2003.

Markrid Hagop Apamian Magarian
BORN: Bandirma; January 6, 1869
DIED: Boston, Mass.; December 13, 1952

Angele Hovhannes Magarian
BORN: Bandirma; March 8, 1899
DIED: Boston, Mass.; October 26, 1987
Thoughts on Armenian-Turkish Relations

It is no secret that Turkey is currently going through a major crisis, a struggle between the secular-nationalist elites and the patriotic-reforming, slightly religiously inclined, democratically elected government in place.

By Dennis R. Papazian

The hard-line secular-nationalists have gone so far as to bring a court case against the government accusing it of betraying Turkey’s secular heritage and seeking to have it outlawed under certain esoteric provisions in Turkey’s constitution. This is a wild and unexpected turn of events.

These radical machinations are a fight for Turkey’s soul, and the fight is growing ugly. I would not have imagined such a crisis even a few years ago. It shows that Turkey has a long way to go to becoming a truly democratic and multi-ethnic state. This internal crisis has thrown off my expectations of Turkish-Armenian reconciliation in the not too distant future; but in any case I will describe what could be the best possible scenario under the present circumstances. One can always hope against hope.

First, I still have hope that Turkish civil society is growing strong enough to make a difference. The evidence so far is certainly inconclusive. The secular-nationalists are making their last stand and apparently will stop at nothing. In cases where the extremists are at war, the moderates are no longer listened to. One can only hope that the situation will change for the better, that the voice of the moderates will be heard once more amid the clamor of the struggle.

Secondly, I believe the Erdogan government has been trying to appease the so-called “deep state,” the elite reactionary forces, by carrying on a fruitless but intensive campaign against the recognition of the Armenian Genocide and by allowing the military to make incursions into northern Iraq against so-called “Kurdish rebels.” I had been hoping that the government was appeasing the reactionary nationalists until it solidified its position in power, and that then, at the appropriate time, it would attempt to bring peace between Turks and Kurds, and Turks and Armenians. That would be a clever political move worthy of Erdogan.

I am sure that the vast majority of the Turkish establishment realizes that the Young Turk government did, indeed, carry out a policy intended to uproot the Armenians from their traditional homeland and exterminate them by sending them on lethal death marches into the burning deserts of Syria. As Talat Pasha said to Henry Morgenthau, the U.S. Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, “I have done more to solve the Armenian question in one year than Abdul Hamid II did in a lifetime.” That is a clear sign of pre-mediation, indeed.
I also see that many independent-thinking Turks, including many prominent Turkish scholars, are trying to educate the Turkish population on the realities of Turkish history, which includes the unjust lethal treatment of Armenians. Many of these scholars, however, are disinclined to use the G-word (genocide) for fear of alienating the Turkish masses and closing their minds to new thinking before it can take root. I think Armenians should work with such high-minded people, whom I personally admire, although politically speaking it is not enough. Nevertheless, it is these scholars and educators who are preparing the ground for political change by building a fresh constituency in Turkey for recognition.

The real question is whether those leading the anti-genocide recognition drive can ever be reached. As unlikely as it seems, it is a distinct possibility. Thinking in terms of real politik, these people must realize that they are losing the battle of international recognition. Their attempts to avoid recognition have backfired over and over again, bringing the Armenian Genocide to almost universal public acknowledgment, as evidenced by the positive world-wide attention the Armenians received during the recent debate over the recognition by the U.S. Congress of the Armenian Genocide. Such recognition passed the House of Representatives in 1975 and 1984, and the initiative is not dead even today.

There are only two countries, in my estimation, that can help these denialists realize they are only making matters worse for Turkey with their public ineptitude. I believe that both the United States and Israel see great negative implications in backing, for purely political reasons, Turkey’s denialism. I think both the United States and Israel see denialism as an albatross around their necks, forced on them by Turkey’s reactionary politicians, and are behind the scenes trying to convince the nationalistic Turks that confession would be the better policy.

It is well known in American business circles that when a company makes grave mistakes injuring the public, the best policy is to openly confess, make apologies, offer some restitution, and then get on with life.

Secondly, I don’t believe they would do anything that puts them under criminal liability. No state would allow its citizens to be prosecuted for a 90-year-old crime, no matter how heinous. Nevertheless, I do think that civil restitution, in some form or another, is a distinct possibility. In other words, I believe that the Turkish state in the not too distant future would seriously consider making some sort of financial restitution to the Armenians, preferably to individuals or recognizable groups of individuals, namely to those who can make reasonable claims. There is even more it might be willing to do in terms of restitution.

I believe the Turkish government might consider the return of Armenian properties, once owned by the community, back to Armenian community foundations. I also expect that they might be willing to lift all of the burdensome and inequitable limitations on Armenian public life in Turkey. That is, Turkey would recognize its legal and moral responsibilities under the Treaty of Lausanne.

Finally, I believe that Turkey might be willing to restore Armenian monuments and to publicly recognize the contributions of Armenians to Anatolian civilization and indeed to the Turkish state itself. And, of course, all this is based on the assumption that Turkey will first lift the embargo against Armenia, attracting the positive attention of the Armenian people.

Is any of this possible? I think so. The world is growing smaller each year, national borders—particularly in Europe—have less and less meaning, populations currently are being mixed, exclusive nationalism is on the wane, and the world is in travail. Changes are coming rapidly. Anything can happen. Who knows what might be expected in the near future? Wise people, however, think of various possible scenarios and plan ahead. Armenians should do no less.

It is well known in American business circles that when a company makes grave mistakes injuring the public, the best policy is to openly confess, make apologies, offer some restitution, and then get on with life.
The multidimensional aspects of Turkish-Armenian relations have gone through monumental changes in the last two decades. Some of the more important changes include: the breakup of the Soviet Union and the rise of an independent Armenian state, which has added a state-to-state dimension to the bilateral relations; the changing political landscape of Turkey, where in the last decade a rising civil society movement has emerged and started challenging the conventional socio-political processes in the country; and the shifting perceptions within the Armenian diaspora regarding Turkish-Armenian relations after the appearance of an internationally recognized actor—Armenia—and its inclusion in the genocide recognition equation.

This article argues that the civil society dimension in Turkish-Armenian relations is important, based on the premise that only in the case of a well-developed and strong civil society in both entities will it be possible to address the issue of genocide in a constructive way.

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Civil Society and Democracy

The definition of civil society that this research focuses on is taken from the Centre for Civil Society at the London School of Economics. According to this definition, civil society:

“...refers to the arena of un-coerced collective action around shared interests, purposes, and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market...”

“...commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors, and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy, and power. Civil societies are often populated by organizations such as registered charities, development non-governmental organizations, community groups, women's organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions, and advocacy groups.” [Emphasis mine]

This being said, it is important to make it clear that civil society operates independent of democracy; it is quite possible to have elements of civil society operating in non-democratic countries, while at the same time not all democracies are conducive to civil society movements.

While civil society and democracy could be mutually exclusive, civil society and commitment to civil action go hand in hand. Commitment to civil action is characterized as individuals acting in unison to advocate “collective action within an array of interests, institutions and networks, developing civic identity, and involving people in governance processes.” Furthermore, commitment to civil action occurs through participation in civil society where individual citizens are provided with opportunities to interact with politicians to influence policy or politics. The development of civil society and civil action are possible either through government encouragement and development of such institutions—in the case of more open and democratic societies—or from a bottom-up process where grass- root organizations coalesce to form civil society groups and encourage citizen participation in political processes.

Finally, in a democratic setting, civil society acts as a mediator between individuals and the state apparatus, hence acting as a conduit to communicate personal views and values into state institutions.

Civil Society in Turkey

Today Turkey is undergoing major domestic changes which are not getting the attention that they deserve from the Armenian side. Over the last eight decades, Turkey has been trying to redefine itself and find its place in a changing world, among changing ideas about what it means to be Turkish. A growing number of human rights activists in Turkey as well as increased civil society movements have been trying to force Turkey to change from within as well as without.

From within, the issues of respecting human rights and the rights of minorities have been almost ever present in the public discourse of successive Turkish governments during the last several decades. While this discourse has been initiated and encouraged by
Ankara’s continued attempts for European Union membership, the results have been more genuine than one would expect; in late 2004, there were some legislative changes to create a less restrictive environment in Turkey and to allow civil society groups to function as alternatives to the existing state institutions. This came as the debate of whether Turkey has viable and self-sustaining civil society movements was “raging” in academic and policy circles.

One manifestation of civil society activism in Turkey occurred in January 2007 with the assassination of the Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink. The assassination of Dink on Jan. 19, 2007 resulted in mass outcries by Turks who regarded Dink and his advocacy important for the development of an open Turkey. There were mass demonstrations in the immediate aftermath of the assassination where demonstrators carried signs that read, “We are all Hrant Dink, we are all Armenians.” While these outcries were cautiously greeted by Armenians, it is quite possible that for those Turks taking the streets, Dink’s assassination provided them with a symbol for their cause to push the envelope for socio-political reforms in Turkey.

CIVIL SOCIETY IN ARMENIA

Similar to the situation in Turkey, civil society movements in Armenia are a new phenomenon. The past decade witnessed a rise in scholarship on the development of civil society in the post-Soviet space, in general, and in Armenia, specifically.

Also similar to Turkey, the civil society movement in Armenia has witnessed more activism in the past several years, as there has been considerable advancement in the way civil society groups have functioned beyond the realm of NGO sector development and have shifted their attention from humanitarian assistance to democracy building focusing on issues such as human trafficking and women’s participation in politics.

Furthermore, the mass demonstrations that Armenia witnessed in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 presidential elections in February 2008 was viewed by many experts as a sign of a growing number of civil society groups in the country where attention was given on the issue of government accountability and respect for human rights.

WHY CIVIL SOCIETY MATTERS

From the perspective of Turkish-Armenian relations, civil society is bound to play an important role in the enhancement of communication between the two entities. While it is quite possible that the initial stages of communication would have to tackle issues less “painful” than genocide recognition, it is conceivable that over time genocide will be put on the discussion agenda at a popular level and, by extension, at the government level. Civil society is an instrument to allow more voices to be heard in the various socio-political processes in any given country and as such facitates more representative policies. However, the development of such an atmosphere is conditioned by the establishment of legal boundaries to protect the emerging public space from the influence of state power. Both Turkey and Armenia have gone a long way to create those legal boundaries; however, civil society movements in both countries are still in their infancy and require more time to entrench themselves in their respective countries.

Observing the current social and political developments in Turkey, it is possible to argue that engaging those elements of Turkish society that are adamant to change the political status quo in their country—by advocating for more openness to discuss controversial issues—could yield better results than the oversimplified view that Turkey is the same country it was 30 or even 10 years ago. The lack of parameters for this engagement is what complicates this task. What is meant by parameters is the identification of actors within Turkish society to engage them in communication with their Armenia counterparts; and the setting up of discussion points which, while seemingly non-controversial, could pave the way for a gradual shift towards identifying issues and topics that make Turkish-Armenian rapprochement difficult.

Extended hands over the divide between Turkish and Armenian societies should be based on—and with the goal of—mutual respect for civil society endeavors. Such a goal should be well thought of and articulated to make sure that individuals, groups, parties, and governments on both sides realize that it is mutually beneficial to further the development of civil society. A Turkey where civil society and rule of law prevail would be more likely to recognize the genocide—or at least entertain the idea of talking about the genocide in a critical manner—than one where the government and society are unwilling to even fathom the idea of using the word “genocide.”

ENDNOTES

1 Definition of civil society, Centre for Civil Society at the London School of Economics at www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/introduction.htm#generated-subheading2, retrieved on March 31, 2008.
4 Ibid.
We enter one of the old Armenian houses. In the courtyard, a young girl is lying on a mattress laid on the ground, obviously very ill, with her head on the knees of an elderly woman who sits with crossed legs, resting her head on her hand, eyes shut. In another corner three young girls sit around a big pot, doing some kitchen work. They greet us, curious about who we are and where we come from. We talk to them, take pictures. Throughout the day we wander around Xancepek, welcomed by the Kurdish families, mostly women, many of them not speaking Turkish at all.

There are two worlds living side by side in Xancepek: a lost world, with dilapidated churches silently standing witness to a reality denied, and the present-day world, seemingly unaware of the other one but falling victim to the same deeply rooted culture of violence.

For us, the absence of the Armenian world is so material that it has an existence of its own. You can feel it every moment.

It is even more disturbing by the fact that the present-day people don’t know anything about the fellow countrymen of their ancestors. They know nothing about the exquisite craftsmanship they once practiced, the beautiful products of a wide variety of professions and the works of art they created. They know nothing about the vivid intellectual life, the newspapers and periodicals.

"Xancepek" is what the Muslim population of Diyarbekir used to call “Gavur Mahallesı,” that is, the neighborhood where the infidels lived. I’m standing in the middle of the ruins of the Armenian Saint Giragos Church in Xancepek, looking at what remains of the exquisite examples of beautiful, refined masonry, and the arched columns and walls where only tiny bits of vividly colored tiles have been left, here and there. Only curious and caring eyes can see them. Above my friends and I, the sun shines, as there is no longer a roof. With the densely populated environs of the church in sharp contrast to its desolation, the place is like a scene from a science fiction movie. The irrationality of having such an unattended historic place in the middle of an overpopulated city, with an absolute lack of any care, is evidence—and very painfully material—of a tragic interruption in Diyarbekir’s social history.
published, the cultural riches. The objective reality is simply non-existent here; it has no meaning, no content for the present inhabitants. The mission to bury the entire civilization was successfully accomplished.

How many people now carry in their inner selves the unbearably heavy memory of June 1, 1915, the day when the Diyarbekir governor, Dr. Resid, “had his militia evacuate 1,060 Armenian men and women of the Armenian neighborhood Xancepek and escort them to the Diyarbekir plain through the Mardin Gate. The people were gathered and a proclamation was read out loud, offering the Armenians their lives in exchange for converting to Islam. Although the decision was not unanimous, the victims refused, whereupon they were stripped of their clothes and belongings. The militia and local Kurdish villagers then massacred them with rifles, axes, swords, and daggers. Many women were raped, some were sold as slaves. The corpses were either thrown in wells or trenches, or left on the plain to rot,” the men on their stomachs, the women on their backs.”

There is another, very grave aspect of this “not-knowing” that lies in the fact that one’s ability to remember and one’s perception of reality is quite fragmented, as all the ruins of the very near history of the Armenian civilization in Asia Minor have been destroyed in search of gold and hidden riches thought to be left by the previous owners. In other words, they do know or did know that there had been people living there, that they were forced to abandon their homes abruptly, and that they could have hidden their wealth somewhere in the church or in their homes or in the wells. They knew that many of them had been killed, but they made themselves forget the painful truth, or buried it deep within themselves; many did not tell the truth to their children and grandchildren. The human mind is frightening in its ability to remember pleasant facts and ignore unpleasant ones. It is the terrifying capability of a human being to manipulate his or her own mind. So, thanks to the successful engineering of the heart and mind and also one’s ability to manipulate his or her own mind, generation after generation the truth gradually ceases to be the truth.

Turkey to a great extent—and not only the new inhabitants of Xancepek—is unaware of the facts about the Armenians, one of the oldest and most productive peoples of Asia Minor.

Here, too, the mechanism of knowing and not knowing is at work. In the collective subconscious of Turkey, there is the vague awareness of the existence of an Armenian, the musician, the architect, a neighbor making delicious food, a jeweler, read about in a memoir, or heard about from an elderly relative, or seen in a movie. However, curiosity and willingness to learn the whereabouts of these people, their roots in this country, is somehow blocked. Ignorance, then, is partly the responsibility of those who conceal the truth, but also partly of those who choose not to be curious.

This is the process whereby people who have fallen victim to a genocide are killed twice, first by a weapon, second by the denial of the truth. A genocide is even more of a genocide when you are not only condemned to death but also condemned to be non-existent in the minds of the people that remain, wiped off not only from the landscape but also from the hearts and minds of the children and grandchildren of your once-fellow country people, once your neighbors. It is because of this reason that denial is the continuation of the extermination spiritually, emotionally and intellectually—a fact refused to be acknowledged by those who still place denial within the scope of freedom of speech.

ENDNOTES


Frank V. Hekimian
Born: Chemishgazac; December 12, 1910
Died: Methuen, Mass.; June 3, 2003

Hazel Gulaksian Tatson
Born: Kharpert; October 15, 1912
Died: Scottsdale, Az.; February 2, 2007
In recent years, there has been much discussion of relations between Armenians and Turks. A movement toward what is termed “reconciliation” has emerged, with committed adherents in both general groups. A key fracture between different participants has turned on the role, if any, that the “events of 1915” should play in contemporary relations. Some Turks with a denialist agenda have argued that “claims” about Turkish violence against Armenians in the past should be set aside so as not to keep driving tensions between the two groups. Some progressive Turks who might accept that the Armenian Genocide is a historical fact as well as some Armenians have joined in this approach. Their utilitarian calculation is clear: The past cannot be changed, but if by putting aside the past we can effect a more positive present and future, then it is right to do so, even for Armenians who will benefit in various ways. I will examine the logic of this kind of claim below; here I wish only to point out that it functions to distinguish some Armenians from others relative to relations with Turks.

Some progressive Turks and many Armenians, on the other hand, see broad state and societal acknowledgment of the Armenian Genocide as the key to improved relations. Typically, they hold that such an acknowledgment will cause or signal a dramatic shift in Turkish attitudes toward Armenians (and Armenian attitudes toward Turks), erasing the primary cause of contemporary
Turkish prejudice against Armenians and Armenian “prejudice” against Turks. (Turkish prejudice is a structural problem. While Armenians are often accused of anti-Turkish prejudice simply for raising the genocide issue. There might be individual prejudices, but these are not systematic and have no structural impact.) Indeed, some progressive Turks go so far as to say that this acknowledgment will force an opening in the Turkish ultranationalist, anti-democratic ideology and institutions that have hindered political progress in Turkey and thus transform Turkey positively. Some Armenians agree and take this transformation of Turkey as their ultimate goal. Just as typically, the Turks and Armenians stop there: entreaty and clerical pronunciation. Resolution is not an event or outcome; it is a process, a very long-term process. Armenian-Turkish relations are not a simple all-or-nothing proposition, either “in tension” or “worked out perfectly.” They are better or worse along a continuum of fine gradations, with no bold line between “good” and “bad” relations. Likewise, they are not fixed, but can fluctuate through time in trajectories of improvement and deterioration. And, as I discuss below, they are greatly complicated by the fact that different Turks and Armenians as well as their governments, institutions, organizations, etc., themselves vary in attitude and behavior, and interact with one another in all sorts of different ways.

If the Armenian Genocide issue is set aside in order not to antagonize or alienate Turks, so that they willingly engage in a relationship with Armenians, the apparently smooth result will not be a resolution.

Not only is acknowledgment necessary for improved relations, it is sufficient as well. Hrant Dink seems to have been in this camp. Finally, some Armenians and a few Turks see the need for a deeper process relative to the Armenian Genocide and contemporary Armenian-Turkish relations. They typically call for a reparative route as the foundation for improved relations: the Turkish government and society must make substantive strides to repair the damage done by the Armenian Genocide, even if all parties recognize that anything approaching full restitution is impossible—the dead can never be brought back to life, and the suffering, even intergenerational, can never be eliminated. At best, the prospects for future Armenian survival can be improved and the identity of Armenians made more secure. While I hold that the path to resolution is through preparation that includes support for the security of Armenian society and identity, I do not hold that even this, taken alone, is the correct model for “reconciliation” between Armenians and Turks.

The basis of the view I share with a few in the Armenian and possibly Turkish communities is not simply—following Raymond Winbush’s critique of white-black reconciliation efforts in the contemporary United States—that “reconciliation” is impossible because there was never a period of stable “conciliation” between Armenians and Turks prior to the genocide. If a certain naivete about history and inter-group relations is revealed by the very use of the term “conciliation,” we can address this by shifting our terminology to, say, Armenian-Turkish “resolution.” But there is a deeper problem, the assumption that there can be a single, decisive transition from “unresolved” to “resolved” through an act or set of acts. This assumption shared by antagonists from Turkish deniers to committed Armenian activists is curiously Christian, echoing the notion of instantaneous absolution for sins through supplicant

In the case where there is no acknowledgment of the Armenian Genocide, it is trivially obvious that no resolution can occur. If the Armenian Genocide issue is set aside in order not to antagonize or alienate Turks, so that they willingly engage in a relationship with Armenians, the apparently smooth result will not be a resolution. The genocide issue cannot be resolved if it is not even engaged. The “conciliation” will be an illusion, because it will depend on a denial of reality and will hold only so long as Armenians themselves accept the success of the genocide and, in a sense, the right of Turks to have committed it. Turks who are not willing to engage the genocide issue are refusing to give up the anti-Armenian attitude behind the genocide itself. Even if that attitude is not displayed explicitly because of Armenian deference does not mean it is not there, but rather that its target is not presenting itself.

Now let us say that acknowledgment occurs. Acknowledgment might be presented as an end in itself—from a Turkish governmental perspective, Armenians will have had their due and should stop bothering “us.” In such a case, nothing will have been accomplished but the uttering of words that do not have meaning. The work of building better Armenian-Turkish relations and of resolving the outstanding issues of the Armenian Genocide will remain open tasks that must be undertaken. If anything, an empty “acknowledgment” will make that future work more difficult, by creating the false impression that something, maybe everything, has already been accomplished.

Here the word is misrepresented as the deed. The pronouncement that the issue has been resolved is mistaken for the reality that it has been resolved. I do not mean to suggest that verbal pronouncements necessarily have no meaning. But they have meaning only when they reflect material and social-structural changes
or cause them. And in this case, no real change will have occurred, except in the subjective perceptions of some Armenians, some Turks, and some others. Though changes in attitudes can result in changes in behavior, treatment, and thus structure of relations, even if some people change their attitudes, if the acknowledgment by the state and broad society is not accompanied by widespread change, it is not meaningful. Here in my argument two threads intertwine. The second thread is argument for the claim that, in the case of Armenian-Turkish relations, something more than a change in subjective attitudes, even widespread, is necessary. I will return to this point below, after finishing out the first thread.

Let us now say that acknowledgment is presented as confirmation that changes are occurring or even have already occurred in Turkish attitudes toward Armenians and the genocide. Is this then a terminus? What is this acknowledgment except a promise? Clearly this is the case if the acknowledgment is meant to establish new relations: The acknowledgment is meaningful only if those relations are actually established. Yet, even if it is the statement that attitudes and relations have already changed, then to be meaningful it must be a promise that those changes will hold. After all, acknowledgment tomorrow could give way to worsened relations and retraction the day after, just as happened in Australia, where a 1997 government report confirming that the policy of forced removal of aboriginal children constituted genocide was later recanted by the Australian government.

Finally, what if acknowledgment is confirmed by reparation, for instance, the return of lands depopulated of Armenians through genocide, to the original Wilsonian boundaries of the 1918 Republic? Clearly this would be closer to producing a sustainably improved relationship between Armenians and Turks. As I have argued previously, the giving of reparations, especially land reparations, transforms acknowledgment and apology into concrete, meaningful acts rather than mere rhetoric: Reparations are a sacrifice on the part of the perpetrator group’s progeny that confirm the sincerity of expressed regret. Would reparation, then, represent a resolution of the Armenian Genocide issue? The historical evidence says no. After all, in 1919, the then-Ottoman government accepted transfer of such land to the new Armenian Republic, as a form of restitution for the genocide, restitution to support the reconstitution of the Armenian people. Within two years, however, the ultranationalist Kemal Ataturk and his forces had renounced this transfer and militarily invaded and conquered these lands, which have remained part of the Republic of Turkey ever since. This act ushered in the long post-genocide period of Turkish antagonism against Armenians that has continued to this day in various forms, from an aggressively pursued, extensive campaign of genocide denial to military and other assistance to Azerbaijan in its attempted ethnic cleansing of Armenians in the Karabagh region.

What even this approach fails to recognize is that any act of resolution is not an endpoint but the beginning of an obligatory ongoing effort by the Turkish state and society to take the actions and maintain the changes necessary to ensure good relations with Armenians. Descartes provides a relevant concept of permanence through time that can be applied to this view of Armenian-Turkish relations. According to Descartes, it is incorrect to see God’s creation of the world as a single act that guarantees the future existence of the world. There is no inertia of existence. On the contrary, at every moment God must re-cause the world for it to exist. If we set aside the religious element here, we can recognize a more general principle: Social relations and structures do not maintain themselves, but require a constant application of effort. Thus, positive relations between Turks and Armenians are not made permanent simply by being enacted at a given point in time. They must be reproduced and supported at every moment, or the relations will degenerate.

The reasons for this are more obvious than for the continued existence of the world as Descartes treats it. His is a metaphysical speculation, the acceptance of a possible metaphysical principle that says an effect does not outlast its cause. This is in fact not a tenable view, if we hold that a given state endures until a counter-force is applied, as in Newtonian physics. But, in the case of Armenian-Turkish relations, two major counter-forces are already in place. If sustained improvement in Armenian-Turkish relations is to be achieved, it will require long-term pressure against these forces.

First is a widespread and active anti-Armenian prejudice. It is manifested in the never-ending stream of anti-Armenian vitriol in the Turkish media, including its English-language extension; political statements and policies; attitudes on the street; the public support for the trial and assassination of Hrant Dink; and even the harassment and threats against Turkish scholars who recognize the Armenian Genocide. Even if the government of Turkey recognizes the Armenian Genocide, this will not necessarily transform those who are explicitly prejudiced against Armenians. In fact, it could heighten their negative attitudes and actions against Armenians in a backlash, recalling the way in which Armenian civil-rights activism “provoked” genocidal violence against them in 1915. This attitude at once pre-dates the genocide as a causal factor, exhibited by and tapped by the Committee of Union and Progress, and was extended and intensified by the success of the genocide. The Turkish ultranationalist Ottoman government, with broad participation by Turkish society, acted on its prejudices with impunity, and has never been called to account for those acts. The attitudes have thus been preserved within Turkish state and society, persisting because no rehabilitative counter-force has been applied. Indeed, one can argue that the success of the Armenian Genocide and the way in which nearly universal horrific violence against Armenians became a core norm of Turkey in 1915 actually supported an increased anti-Armenianism based on the belief that Armenians are fit targets of the most extreme prejudice and violence, which can be perpetrated with absolute...
impunity. This general trend is true despite the heroic efforts of some Turks then to oppose the genocide and now to oppose its denial.

Second, the result of genocide is not a neutral disengagement of the perpetrator and victim groups, but the imposition of an extreme dominance of perpetrator group over victim group. If prior to the Armenian Genocide, Turks and other Muslims as a group were formally and practically dominant over Armenians as a group, the genocide maximized this, to give Turks and other Muslims absolute dominance to the level of life and death over Armenians. Often we mistake the end of a genocide for the end of the harm done to the victims. It is the end of the direct killing, perhaps, but the result of that killing and all other dimensions of a genocide is to raise the power and position of the perpetrator group high above that of victims, in material terms—political, economic, etc. Resolution of the Armenian Genocide requires reversing this domination.

Can this be accomplished through a change in relations between Armenians and Turks? At an individual level, good relations are possible, but this does not guarantee a change in overall group relations. Inter-group relations are very complex, and are best understood as resultant vectors or overall patterns. Turks and Armenians relate to members of their own groups and the other group in all sorts of ways. Attitudes and acts of Turks can directly enact or support domination of Armenians, can be neutral with respect to that domination, or can even resist that domination. What is more, the resistance, for instance, can be by means of a direct engagement with Turkish anti-Armenianism or an embrace of abstract humanism. While the latter might be a counter-force against Turkish ultranationalism, it can also be at cross-purposes to the direct engagement approach. Thus, a move against ultranationalism is not necessarily in line with absolute progress in Armenian-Turkish relations. What is more, in some cases Armenians and Turks have very close individual relationships that can even take primacy over intra-group tensions. All these factors play out to determine the overall structure of the relationship of Turks to Armenians as general groups. And this model indicates that individual attitudes and resistances, while they can influence group relations, do not determine them. The best intentions on the part of a Turkish dialogue partner will not necessarily challenge the dominance relation in which Turks and Armenians are caught. This suggests an important distinction. So far, I have not distinguished clearly between “conciliation” and “resolution.” But does resolution of the genocide issue have to include conciliation? If the key to resolution is eliminating dismantling the domination pro-

...If Turkey is transformed into a true liberal democracy, with universal territorial citizenship, equal participation of citizens in governmental decision-making, and protected individual rights for all citizens regardless of ethnicity and religion ... then “the Armenian Question” will be solved.

Similarly, good relations with Armenians might have for some Turks a therapeutic function that displaces the putative goal of resolving the Armenian Genocide. Being accepted by Armenians might authorize the subjective perception by such Turks that the genocide issue is resolved, when it is not. Turkish-Armenian dialogue might then be seen to be a matter of self-interest of Turks, even an exploitation of Armenians for the psychological benefit of Turks in which Armenians fulfill the psychological needs of Turks while their own objective need for resolution of the genocide issue is pushed aside.

There remains an alternative possibility for resolution of the Armenian Genocide issue embraced by many Turkish and Armenian progressives, that is, the democratic transformation of

Diran Kalfayan
BORN: Smyrna; 1911
DIED: Alexandri, Egypt; 2000

Haroutiun Boghos Arzouhaldjian
BORN: Urfa; 1905
DIED: Beirut, Lebanon; 1983
Turkey. The logic is clear: If Turkey is transformed into a true liberal democracy, with universal territorial citizenship, equal participation of citizens in governmental decision-making, and protected individual rights for all citizens regardless of ethnicity and religion (and, one would hope, gender, sexuality, and race), then “the Armenian Question” will be solved. Armenians in Turkey will be full citizens with every right protected. They will be free to be Armenians and Turkish citizens. And, a democratic Turkey with free speech protected will no longer penalize discussion of the Armenian Genocide. Sooner or later, the truth will take hold, and the denialist machinery of government, academia, and media will become obsolete and silent. Turkey will recognize the Armenian Genocide and the need to treat Armenians humanely. It will make good on the promise of the 1908 Revolution to establish a multinational liberal democracy in Turkey. And, democracy will be a cure-all for Turkish society.

It is true that the democratization of Turkey could bring these results. But the history of modern liberal democracies suggests otherwise. The United States maintained an expanding democracy throughout its first century of existence, and yet maintained just as strongly the slavery of people of African descent and pursued genocidal policies against Native Americans. During its second century, it maintained a long-term apartheid segregationist system followed by a sophisticated form of neo-racist domination that is still with us today—and yet it celebrates a comprehensive democracy. This is to say nothing of American democracy’s participation in the recent genocides in Indonesia, East Timor, and Guatemala. Britain could self-congratulate on its wonderful constitutional democratic institutions while maintaining colonial rule in India and beyond. France today is a great democracy, except for Arabs. And so on. In short, there is nothing about the democratization of Turkey that is in the least inconsistent with a continued, pervasive anti-Armenianism. On the contrary, one might almost see racism against some minority inside or outside a state’s borders as an invariable accompaniment of modern democracy. Do people need someone who is lower in order to accept equality across most of a society?

The danger is that the public profession of democracy and civil rights for all in Turkey might mask a situation in which rampant anti-Armenian prejudice renders those rights empty and even dangerous in exercise. The fact is that the democratization of Turkey in itself is nothing to Armenians: Its essence will be a redistribution of power and decision-making among the majority segments of the society. The very foundations of Turkish national identity, statehood, and culture were formed through genocide of Armenians and other Ottoman minorities. The assumption that mere democratization, a mere shifting of power relations, can address these foundational issues is naive. Armenians cannot simply be folded into a general democratic process. What Armenians are in Turkey and beyond today has been deeply impacted and shaped by the raw political and material facts of genocide and its unmitigated, expanding effects over more than nine decades. Any change in Armenians’ status must directly address this history and the present that it has produced. However well-intentioned, the integration of Armenians into Turkish society requires much more than calls of “We are all Armenians.” (I have to ask, can it even be called Turkish society if it is to integrate Armenians? Will this not be just another result of the genocide, the folding of Armenians into Turkish identity?) In any event, Turks are not Armenians, not because progressive Turks refuse the connection nor because Armenians do, but because an unresolved history forces a difference in basic material terms.

The goal of my analysis has not been to paint the picture of a hopeless situation, but rather to appraise realistically the effectiveness of Armenian-Turkish dialogue and other approaches for resolving the Armenian Genocide issue. The conclusion I draw is simple: There is no easy path to resolution, no single step that can be taken to reverse the damage of the Armenian Genocide. What is more, resolution does not require Armenian-Turkish dialogue or positive relations; it requires an end to the Turkish dominance relation over Armenians and repair of at least some of the damage done by it before, during, and after the Armenian Genocide. Further, while democratic transformation of Turkey might be desirable in itself, it is not a guarantee of resolution of the Armenian Genocide issue.

ENDNOTES
1 Probably the best known example of denialist Turks joined with Armenians who, at least temporarily, set aside the Armenian Genocide is the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC).
2 This is, for instance, Taner Akcam’s view, as stated for instance in his remarks at the Commonwealth of Massachusetts’ Official 91st Anniversary Commemoration of the Armenian Genocide, House of Representatives Chamber, Massachusetts State House, April 21, 2006.
5 “Justice or Peace?”
8 This emphasis on the structure, not individual, nature of oppression is influenced by Marilyn Frye’s “Oppression” chapter in The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory (Freedom, Calif.: Crossing Press, 1983), pp. 1–16.
Julie Dermansky was born in New York City in 1966 and grew up in Englewood, N.J. She received her bachelor of fine arts from Tulane University in New Orleans and worked as a painter and sculptor in New York for 10 years. She ran a corporation making furniture in upstate New York before switching paths and committing herself to photography. She began traveling the world in January 2005. Since then, her most stable address has been her email address. Her focus now is on documenting sites of “dark tourism,” including genocide memorials. The series will be shown in New York at the Center for Architecture in September and at the University of Southern California in spring 2009. She has received a Thomas J. Watson Fellowship and a fast-track award from the National Endowment for the Arts. Her work has been written about in numerous publications including the New York Times. She is currently based in New York.
1. Stacked bones at one of Cambodia's many genocide memorials spread throughout the country. There are 72 known sites with genocide monuments.

2. At the Genocide Memorial and Museum of Murambi (outside of the university town of Butare), built on the site where thousands of bodies were exhumed. 1,800 of the bodies, now mummified remains, are displayed on tables in the rooms where the victims were imprisoned before being massacred.

3. Worker at the Genocide Memorial of Murambi in one of the rooms where the remains of the victims are on display.

4. Photos of victims on display at the Genocide Memorial and Museum in Murambi.

5. A metal gate at Dachau, a former concentration camp in Germany, which opened in 1933 and is now the site of a museum and memorial.

6. A road in the Majdanek Death Camp in Lublin, Poland, now the home of a museum and memorial.

7. One of 8,000 grave markers in Srebrenica of Bosnian Muslims massacred by Bosnian Serbs in July 1995.
Alex Rivest was born and raised in Boston, Mass., and is currently working on a Ph.D. in neuroscience at MIT. His goals with photography are to bring awareness about small corners of the globe, to challenge people’s stereotypes and assumptions about others and their way of life, and to get people involved with charitable work. He has recently turned his attention to orphanages and poverty-alleviation in Rwanda, and sells his photography to support various causes and orphanage projects there. Currently he is helping fund six school-age children through school, is supporting two college students, and has raised enough money to build a bakery which uses its profits to support over 100 orphaned children, all by selling his photography. More of his work can be seen online at www.alexrivest.com; the charitable projects can be seen at www.horebrwanda.org. Alex encourages readers to contact him if they are interested in getting involved.
1. Woman picking tea in southwestern Rwanda. High in the hills, tea is picked by hand and constitutes Rwanda's largest export.

2. A woman in traditional clothing carries her produce to a local market.

3. Workers at a tea processing facility. These men keep the fires burning that create the heat that dries the tea, prior to packaging.

4. In the old center of Kigali, a woman walks carrying produce on her head; the man on the right is a local musician.

5. An orphanage outside of Kigali.

6. While driving through Rwanda, every time you stop the car, curious children come out to greet you.
Բանաստեղծություն

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9. Մեկ սալից մեծ ճյուղ գերից որոշ նախագծային ծրագրեր ունեն, որոնց մասին կարելի է գրել մեկ կամ երկու շահագրք։

Այստեղ բացվում է նախագծի միջոցով իրականացված հավասարակշռության մեջ առաջին քայլը, որը կարող է ներկա լինել նոր համակարգչային կառույցի կառուցման համար։

10. Թվային ու գրաֆիկայի կազմը

Ներկայությունը համարվում է առաջին հետագա շահագրքի ճյուղի կազմակերպման համար:

11. Լուծասխան լուծման մեթոդ

Այս հատվածում են ներկայացվում տարբեր լուծասխանի մեթոդներ, որոնց միջոցով կարելի է ուսումնասիրել լուծասխանի կախուցումը զանգվածի մարմնային կառուցվածքի վրա։

12. Տեղեկություններ ու գրականություն

Բացի այդ կարելի է ներկայացնել տեղեկություններ ու գրականության մեջ համապատասխան կառուցվածքի որոշ տեղեկություններ, որոնք կարող են օգտագործվել նոր կառուցվածքի կառուցման համար։

13. Տեսանյութ կազմակերպման ճյուղի կազմակերպման մեջ

Առաջին քայլում կարելի է օգտագործել տեսանյութ կազմակերպման ճյուղի կազմակերպման մեջ, որը կարող է լինել նոր կառուցվածքի կազմակերպման համար։

14. Ակտիվացում ու գրականության կազմակերպման ճյուղի կազմակերպման մեջ

Բացի այդ կարելի է ներկայացնել տեղեկություններ ու գրականության մեջ համապատասխան կառուցվածքի որոշ տեղեկություններ, որոնք կարող են օգտագործվել նոր կառուցվածքի կառուցման համար։

Այս հատվածում են ներկայացվում տեղեկություններ ու գրականության մեջ համապատասխան կառուցվածքի որոշ տեղեկություններ, որոնք կարող են օգտագործվել նոր կառուցվածքի կառուցման համար։
I. Այսօրվային պատմական իրադարձությունների միջոցով նման պատմական իրադարձությունների առաջացումը համապատասխան կապված է այսօրվային պատմական իրադարձությունների միջոցով, որոնք ծանր զգացում են նաև ուսանողների մեջ։ Այսօրվային պատմական իրադարձությունների միջոցով ուսանողները զգացում են իրենց պատմական իրադարձությունների նկատմամբ։ Այսօրվային պատմական իրադարձությունների միջոցով ուսանողները զգացում են իրենց պատմական իրադարձությունների նկատմամբ։ Այսօրվային պատմական իրադարձությունների միջոցով ուսանողները զգացում են իրենց պատմական իրադարժությունների նկատմամբ։ Այսօրվային պատմական իրադարձությունների միջոցով ուսանողները զգացում են իրենց պատմական իրադարձությունների նկատմամբ։ Այսօրվային պատմական իրադարձությունների միջոցով ուսանողները զգացում են իրենց պատմական իրադարձությունների նկատմամբ։ Այսօրվային պատմական իրադարձությունների միջոցով ուսանողները զգացում են իրենց պատմական իրադարձությունների նկատմամբ։ Այսօրվային պատմական իրադարձությունների միջոցով ուսանողները զգացում են իրենց պատմական իրադարձությունների նկատմամբ։ Այսօրվային պատմական իրադարձությունների միջոցով ուսանողները զգացում են իրենց պատմական իրադարձությունների նկատմամբ։ Այսօրվային պատմական իրադարձությունների միջոցով ուսանողները զգացում են իրենց պատմական իրադարձությունների նկատմամբ։ Այսօրվային պատմական իրադարձությունների միջոցով ուսանողները զգացում են իրենց պատմական իրադարձությունների նկատմամբ։ Այսօրվային պատմական իրադարձությունների միջոցով ուսանողները զգացում են իրենց պատմական իրադարձությունների նկատմամբ։ Այսօրվային պատմական իրադարձությունների միջոցով ուսանողները զգացում են իրենց պատմական իրադարձությունների նկատմամբ։ Այսօրվային պատմական իրադարձություն

5. Այսօրվային պատմական իրադարձությունների միջոցով զգացում են իրենց պատմական իրադարձությունների միջոցով զգացում են իրենց պատմական իրադարձություն

II. Տարբեր յուրաքանչյուր պատմական իրադարձություն ժամանակակից պատմական իրադարձություն

Ավարտ: 2020 թ. 03 ապրիլ
Պահանջում ենք եթե պատասխան հանդիպումը կարողանանք ուսումնասենթական լրավորություններին երկրում առկա մարդկության համար մեծ նպատակներ ունեն։ Այս պահանջած իրավունքների համար նման ենք ունենալու ապահովիչ կարգեր, որոնք նպատակով տեղի են ունենում երկրի ազգերի պատասխանատվության համար։ Այսպիսով, այս պահանջում ենք ունենալու կարգերի լրագրությունները, որից հետո ենք կարողանանք երկրի ազգերի ազգային նպատակների համար։
1895թ. համարիչների բարձրակետն է դարձել՝ որպես վարչական քարտուղար Անձնակազմի նախագահության կարգավորման և անկումի մասին խոստում պատասխանների համար դարձնելու համար։ Այսպիսով, նրանց է տրվել պահանջում տեղեկությունների տարածումը և համարիչների գործունեության պաշտպանության։ Համարիչները տրվել էին պատասխանատվության համար անկումի և կողմնակիցների հետ հարցնելու համար։

1896թ. համարիչների բարձրակետն է դարձել, որպես վարչական քարտուղար Անձնակազմի նախագահության կարգավորումների և անկումների մասին խոստում պատասխանատվության համար։ Համարիչները տրվել էին պատասխանատվության համար անկումի և կողմնակիցների հետ հարցնելու համար։

1897թ. համարիչների բարձրակետն է դարձել, որպես վարչական քարտուղար Անձնակազմի նախագահության կարգավորումների և անկումների մասին խոստում պատասխանատվության համար։ Համարիչները տրվել էին պատասխանատվության համար անկումի և կողմնակիցների հետ հարցնելու համար։
ՊԵՏԱՅԱՆԻ Ե ԳՏՈՒՄԱԿՈՒԹՅԱՆ�
ԻՆՍԵՐԻՍՆԵՐԸ ԵՐԱԳՐՈՒԹՅԱՆ Մ. Ա. ԱՆՈՒՆՅԱՆ

Անգամ տարի առաջ, անհրաժեշտ էր զարգացնել Հայաստանի Զարգացման կուսակցության կապակետ և զարգացում ստեղծել նոր կարգերի միջոցով, այսպիսով զարգացնել Հայաստանի մեջ զարգացման բարձրությունը և ձեռնարկել նոր զարգացման ոլորտները: Ուշադրութիւն, որ զարգացում չի կարողանա ընդհանուր զարգացում, եթե չի կարողանա երկրի ցանցում, ինչպես նախընտրվող անդամների կողմից: Փոքր կողմերի կազմակերպություններ և կազմակերպություններ զարգացնում, որոնք երկրի ցանցում չեն, կարողում են զարգացնել ընկալում փոքր կողմերի կազմակերպություններ և կազմակերպություններ երկրի ցանցում չեն: Զարգացման քարտեզի ուսումնական քարտեզի զարգացման բարձրությունը խոստանում է, եթե զարգացման բարձրությունը էդարով կրթություն է զարգացում, որոշ այդ տեսնում քարտեզի զարգացման բարձրությունը ընդհանուր զարգացում չի կրթություն է զարգացում, ինչպես նախընտրվող անդամների կողմից: Փոքր կողմերի կազմակերպություններ և կազմակերպություններ զարգացնում, որոնք երկրի ցանցում չեն, կարողում են զարգացնել ընկալում փոքր կողմերի կազմակերպություններ և կազմակերպություններ երկրի ցանցում չեն.
Անվանակարգը հագուստ է։ Այստեղ պատմվում է Հայաստանի պատմությունը, որը զգացած է նոր ժամանակներում։ Այստեղ բազմատեսակ տեղեկություններ տեղակայված են, որոնք կարող են օգտագործվել պատմության համար։ Պատմական թվային ուսումնասիրությունների հիման վրա գրված համար Այստեղ անվանակարգը դարձյալ է։

Պատմական թվային ուսումնասիրությունների հիման վրա գրված համար Այստեղ անվանակարգը դարձյալ է։

Պատմական թվային ուսումնասիրությունների հիման վրա գրված համար Այստեղ անվանակարգը դարձյալ է։

Պատմական թվային ուսումնասիրությունների հիման վրա գրված համար Այստեղ անվանակարգը դարձյալ է։
The text appears to be a mix of different languages, possibly including Armenian, but the content is not clear or coherent. Without proper context or clearer text, it's challenging to provide a meaningful translation or summary.
Haigazoon Semerdjian, an Armenian, lived with his family in Konya, Turkey, where he owned a store that carried fabrics imported from Europe and England. The Semerdjian family’s lives changed radically in 1915, when a new wave of violence broke out against the Armenians in Turkey. Haigazoon opened his home to refugees fleeing persecution in the countryside, and distributed American relief funds to those in need. Eventually, he, his wife Verghin, and their four children were also forced to flee. They found safety in Constantinople (today’s Istanbul), but some of their relatives, including Verghin’s parents and younger brother, could not escape; they perished along with over a million other Armenians.

As described in "Heroic Posterity", a book by Stepan Z. Hambartsumyan published in 1997, some Armenian deportees managed to escape through the help of the Allies. The account includes the story of Haigazoon Semerdjian and his family’s escape to Constantinople, where they found safety.
1913-12-19-ի շրջանում իր ստեղծյալ գրական գույններով տարածվեց Ա. Ակինչյանը: «Անծաներ, որում Բ. Բերին կաուք է գալու է», ստեղծիչների մեջ նոր է հայտնաբերվում։ Ակինչյանը, իսկ այս հետագաշրջանում, ճգնաժամի հավաքածուն համարելով հայտնելու կարողությամբ, նրանց նոր տեսակի գրական աշխատանքների համար ճշմարյաւություն ուներ, որոնք հաճախ ներկայացվում էին հայ գրականության կենտրոններում հայ կուսակցության ընթացքում կատարվող գրական աշխատանքներում։

1914-12-19-ին նկարագրվում է Ակինչյանի նոր գրական աշխատանքների համար: Նա նշանակում է նրանց բացահայտումը իր հայ գրականության մեջ, որոնք ճանաչվում են հայ գրականության մեջ։

Ակինչյանի մասին նկարագրության մեջ նշված է նրա շատ տարածված գրական աշխատանքների և նախագիծների համար։

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Ակինչյանի մասին նկարագրության մեջ նշված է նրա շատ տարածված գրական աշխատանքների և նախագիտների համար։
Բույսերի կրկնօրինակ ծառայությունների համար տարբեր եու կազմակերպումներ են ազդելու և զարգացնելու ուղղություններ, որոնք կարող են համարվել նպատակագործությունների առաջնություններում։

Արևելյան տարբերակների համար տարբեր եու կազմակերպումներ են ազդելու և զարգացնելու ուղղություններ, որոնք կարող են համարվել նպատակագործությունների առաջնություններում։

Պատմական տարբերակների համար տարբեր եու կազմակերպումներ են ազդելու և զարգացնելու ուղղություններ, որոնք կարող են համարվել նպատակագործությունների առաջնություններում։
Անձնագրերը, թեև նրանց առաջին հարցերին, ժամանակակից գրականության և կրթության բնագավառում, հաճախ կարող են դասավորվել ու բերվել նրական էկոնոմիկ բնագավառում։ Որոշ տեսանյութերը, որոնք կարող են դասավորվել և փոխազդել տեխնոլոգիական ձևով, կարող են լինել լայնակարգ հանգստի և զարգացման հետ կազմակերպված և զարգացված մշակութային շրջաններում։

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Հրատարակչություն։ Հրատարակչությունը տեղի է ունեցել 2006 թվականի վերջին, կազմակերպված էր Խորհրդային Միության Հայաստանի Հանրապետության կողմից։

- Վերջինիս համար: Վերջինիս համար պետք է լինի, որ սովորողները ունեն այս տեղեկատվությունը։

- Առաջին հատոր: Առաջին հատորը ներկայացվել է 2006 թվականի վերջին, կազմակերպված էր Խորհրդային Միության Հայաստանի Հանրապետության կողմից։

- Վերջինիս համար: Վերջինիս համար պետք է լինի, որ սովորողները ունեն այս տեղեկատվությունը։